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The Shape of Things

THE PAST WEEK MAY WELL PROVE TO HAVE marked the turning point of the war. Our sometimes lumbering democratic machine was shifted at last into high gear as Congress rushed through the last stages of the Lease-Lend bill. Without a moment's delay Mr. Roosevelt asked for a round seven billion dollars to implement the measure and the House quickly went to work on the appropriation bill. Money on this scale not merely talks; it shouts in tones that rouse the dictators to spasms of psychotic rage and spur those resisting them to new efforts and new hope. And before the echoes of these explosive billions had died down the President rubbed in their meaning in a message that reached every corner of the earth. His speech was a challenge to the Axis powers, a warning that from now on material aid would pour forth in ever larger quantities until the forces of democracy prevail. It was also a challenge to ourselves—a challenge to overcome all obstacles, to speed up production to the utmost, and to accept cheerfully the temporary sacrifices which the job we have undertaken demands.

*

BRITAIN RESPONDED TO THE PASSAGE OF THE Lease-Lend Act by a renewed offensive against Germany and the invasion ports. Assured of new supplies from this country the RAF went into action over Berlin, Hamburg, and the Ruhr on a larger scale than ever before. New types of bombers carrying heavier loads and with a longer range were employed and reports suggest that they have caused heavy damage to industrial plants, docks, and communications. The *Luftwaffe* has also speeded up attacks against Britain, striking particularly at the western ports which are the gateway for American material. No doubt these attacks have caused losses but the British are encouraged by the greater effectiveness of their defenses, which are now proving really dangerous to night-raiders. Although Hitler in his latest speech boasted that Germany was stronger than ever before, there is good reason to hope that its relative strength has diminished. It is noteworthy that, while he once again assured his audience that no power on

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earth could prevent Britain's fall, he did not repeat the promise made in his last speech that victory would be achieved this year.

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THE ASSURANCE OF AMERICAN AID HAS proved a factor also in the diplomatic struggle taking place in the Balkans. For weeks Yugoslavia has been balanced on a knife-edge but with every indication that the weight of the Axis would be decisive. But now the balance seems to have swung the other way. Prince Regent Paul and his principal ministers have been attempting to maintain an equilibrium between the demands of Germany, which wants Yugoslavia to follow the Bulgarian example in submitting itself to protection and occupation, and popular opinion, which is growing increasingly antagonistic to any form of Nazi domination. An attempted compromise by which Yugoslavia would sign a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Germany and Italy has proved unsatisfactory to the Germans while it is opposed inside the country as *de facto* surrender. The news from America and reports that strong British forces are landing in Greece have increased popular pressure on the government and there now seems a chance that negotiations with Germany may break down entirely. By asking too much Hitler may have suffered a diplomatic setback in Belgrade which can only be retrieved by military measures. But this would mean the opening of a broad Balkan front—just the end which he has striven anxiously to avoid. The Yugoslavian army is now being mobilized. It is numerous and composed of tough fighters capable of occupying the attention of many German divisions despite poor equipment. No doubt the mechanized Nazi troops could rapidly overrun the northern plains but the mountains of the south and west are ideally suited to defense by troops schooled in guerilla warfare. Moreover, with Yugoslavia ranged against the Axis, the resistance of Greece would be further strengthened and Turkey would be encouraged to throw its weight against the Axis. During the past week the Greeks claim to have thrown back a large-scale Italian counter-offensive. The advent of Yugoslavia as a Greek ally would at once endanger the rear of the fascist army, making its position in Albania untenable.

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MUSSOLINI'S LEGIONS IN EAST AFRICA ARE being rapidly cut into disconnected pieces. Since the British victory in Somaliland which yielded 31,000 prisoners, the largest body left intact seems to be the garrison at Cheren in Eritrea. This force is estimated at 40,000 and is believed to include the most reliable native and Italian regiments remaining in this war zone. The British strategy appears to aim at containing this position, constantly battering it from the air and with artillery but refraining from an assault which might prove costly. With limited manpower the utmost economy is essential, and General Wavell has already shown what can be accomplished on these lines. Meanwhile, several columns aided by Ethiopian tribesmen, some under British officers, are harrying the Italians in western Ethiopia and pushing them back toward Addis Ababa from which their only remaining avenue of retreat will be the railroad to French Somaliland. However, still another British column driving rapidly forward from conquered Italian Somaliland is threatening to cut the railroad at Diredawa. If this move succeeds, the final disintegration of Mussolini's East African empire will not be long delayed.

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AMONG GERMANY'S "GIFTS" TO FRANCE, according to the official Berlin list, were 225,000 tons of wheat, 100,000 tons of potatoes—and 500,000 tons of newsprint. Even Mr. Hoover would have difficulty proving that the potatoes were actually delivered; but the news that has come out of Paris and Vichy of late makes us feel quite sure that the figure for newsprint is correct. Admiral Darlan himself must have used up a good deal of it trying to prove to the French people that the Germans have been "more generous and humanitarian than the British"—in his larger attempt to win support for his obvious desire to put the French fleet into the service of the Axis. Incidentally, the comparative figures for newsprint and potatoes are an accurate reflection of the five-to-one ratio between food and propaganda which prevails in the provinces of the "new order," including Germany itself where the master race dwells.

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RECENT REPORTS FROM CHINA INDICATE that the dispute between right-wing Kuomintang elements and the former Red Army units is still far from being settled. There is a sharp divergence in the statement of issues as reported by official Kuomintang circles and independent American observers such as Edgar Snow and Major Evans Fordyce Carlson. The Kuomintang charges the Communists with breaking the united front agreement by seeking to establish themselves politically in the territories recaptured from the Japanese and refusing to submit to orders from the Minister of War. In reply the Communists accuse Chungking of seeking to destroy the Fourth and Eighth Route armies, which have played such a conspicuous role in defense against Japan, and with retarding democratic progress in China. It is obvious that a real cleavage has developed in which each side is convinced of the justice of its cause. In such a controversy there is nothing to be gained by trying to assess the relative share of blame. A break could serve no one's interest except Japan's. If civil war develops, there will be no China for either Chiang Kai-shek or the Communists to rule. And the United States will have lost its chief defense against Japanese dominance of the Pa-

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cific. This country has no direct concern in the outcome of the factional struggle in China. But it is vitally concerned that China should retain its unity in the face of Japanese aggression. To this end it might well make it clear to both factions that the continuation of American aid depends on a peaceful settlement of their dispute.

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REJECTION BY THE SOFT-COAL OPERATORS of the eight-state Appalachian region of the United Mine Workers' proposals for a new contract does not necessarily foreshadow a shutdown on April 1 when the present agreement expires. It was merely part of a preliminary and almost formal skirmish, following which the joint conference appointed a subcommittee to discuss a new agreement. Although Charles O'Neill, spokesman for the operators, suggested that the financial cost of the miners' program would be crippling, the proposals put forward by John L. Lewis do not appear exorbitant. He asked for a blanket increase of one dollar per day for regular classifications of day-workers with corresponding increases for piece-workers. Contrary to expectation, no change in hours was proposed but there were demands for a minimum guarantee of 200 days' work a year, two-week vacations with pay, and rigid safeguards against accidents, including the right of workers' safety committees to inspect any mining operation and authorize a suspension of work when dangerous conditions were discovered. This last proposal is of especial importance. As Mr. Lewis pointed out, mine fatalities in 1940 reached 1,400, an increase of 342 over 1939. Non-fatal accidents number tens of thousands, putting an untold burden of suffering on the miners and their families. Even in unsentimental terms of dollars and cents this "blood on the coal" is costly, involving a charge of 20 cents a ton or, in 1940, of $90,600,000. This, incidentally, is only some $18,000,000 short of Mr. O'Neill's estimate of the cost of the new wage schedules asked by the U. M. W. Yet the operators seem to have brushed the question of safety aside. We do not think such callousness will help their relations with the public any more than will their refusal to accept a non-stoppage resolution stipulating that any increase in wages finally determined should be retroactive to April 1.

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THE CHOICE OF JUDGE CHARLES B. SEARS TO preside at the new deportation hearings for Harry Bridges would seem to guarantee a trial fully as fair as that conducted by James M. Landis. Judge Sears, who recently retired from the New York Court of Appeals, is a jurist of high repute. At the New York State constitutional convention he led the fight against the proposed amendment which would have hamstrung administrative agencies. Although Bridges is now to be tried under a law which makes it a deportable offense ever to have been a member of a party that advocates overthrow of the government by force, the issue this time differs little from last. It is useful to recall that Landis did not pass merely upon the question of whether Bridges was a Communist at the time of his arrest. "The defense lawyers," Landis said on the closing day of the hearings, "have taken the stand that Bridges never was affiliated with the Communist Party, and that therefore he is not now affiliated with the party. Since the defense takes that stand, it follows that if the government does establish that he was at any time affiliated, that affiliation must be deemed to hold true now." Only the split hair of a legal technicality distinguishes this retrial from the double jeopardy against which the Constitution protects citizen and alien alike.

Speed British Aid

PASSAGE of the aid-to-Britain bill commits the United States belatedly, but irrevocably, to the policy of making this country the arsenal for the democracies. As opponents of the bill never tired of pointing out, this policy carries certain risks. While we do not believe that the risks are nearly as great as those involved in failing to help Britain, they undeniably exist. But they are serious only in case of an Axis victory. So far Germany has practically ignored the passage of the bill, but press comments in Rome make it clear that the Axis partners regard the bill's enactment as bringing the United States into the war on a non-belligerent basis. They also make it clear that the Axis will retaliate with whatever weapons it may have at its disposal.

It is evident also that the Axis has no intention of forcing the issue to the point of a declaration of war as long as Britain remains unconquered. But our security depends more than ever on a British victory. Having taken the plunge, we dare not leave a stone unturned in the effort to give Britain full assistance in the least possible time. The President has shown that he understands the gravity of the situation by asking for an immediate appropriation of $7,000,000,000. No intimation has been given as to how long the Administration expects this appropriation to last. Some press comments have suggested that it might last until 1942 or 1943. We cannot believe that this view is shared by the President. Estimates that have appeared in these columns indicate that Britain will need assistance to the extent of approximately $1,000,000,000 a month if it is to hold its own against the Axis during the remainder of this year. And the need will be greatest in the next six months. If Britain is to make up its deficiencies in armament as compared with Germany, our aid must exceed the $1,000,000,000 level during the vital spring and summer season.

Such a task can be achieved only by a fundamental

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shake-up in our defense program. Shipments to the British Empire in the past six months have been averaging only about $200,000,000 a month. In January they reached a peak of $224,000,000. The transfers now under way from army and navy stocks—the amount is still unrecorded—will doubtless bring the March and April figures substantially above the earlier ones; but it is doubtful whether we are yet in striking distance of the $1,000,000,000 level.

The reaching of this level is largely a problem of production. Despite recent gains, the industrial capacity of the country is still not fully organized for defense. Plane production in February was under that of January. A recent report by William S. Knudsen shows that 784 industrial plants have added to their capacity by an estimated total cost of $2,138,000,000 with the aid or encouragement of the United States or British governments. This is but a small fraction of the 175,000 manufacturing plants in the country, a large proportion of which could aid in the defense program if a more adequate system could be organized for farming out parts.

Some stepping up in aid to Britain is also possible within the limits of present production. For some months we have been proceeding on the assumption that England was to receive half of our defense output while half was to be reserved for the American armed forces. In some types of armament this figure has undoubtedly been surpassed. Britain has been receiving from 80 to 90 per cent of our output of combat planes. But except for a few special categories, Britain has not even come close to receiving half of our defense output. This may be seen from the figures of our defense expenditures. From July to September, 1940, American military expenditures amounted to about $200,000,000 a month, which was about equal to our shipments to the British Empire. But beginning with October our military expenditures began to rise. In November they rose to $375,000,000; in January they amounted to $572,000,000; and in February they reached $596,000,000. Thus in February we were spending nearly three dollars for domestic defense for every dollar's worth of goods shipped to the British Empire. It is true our military budget includes such items as the building of barracks for the new draft army and advances for plant expansion which can scarcely be compared with actual defense production. But even allowing for these items, the fact remains that our defense expenditures greatly exceed our material aid to Britain in these critical months. If we were wholly realistic, this situation would be reversed. If we get sufficient aid to Britain and get it there quickly, there would be little need for an expansion of our own defenses. But if we fail to aid Britain adequately, we shall have to increase our present rate of defense expenditures manyfold to obtain the same protection now afforded by a free and powerful Britain.

The Vichy Front

ADMIRAL Darlan's recent threat to convoy foodships through the British blockade and to fight for their protection "so that France can eat" was clearly inspired if not ordered by Berlin. Twenty-four hours before he made his statement the German-controlled Paris radio announced he would take a threatening line, and immediately it was published the Nazi press voiced lip-smacking approval. A long step forward had been taken, in the German view, towards bringing about a clash between France and Britain that would put the former in the war on the side of the Axis.

Hitler, and even more Mussolini, has lately been made aware that sea-power is by no means obsolete. In the eastern Mediterranean the British fleet is a preponderant factor and the two dictators would dearly like to divert at least part of its strength to the task of watching the still powerful remnants of the French navy. Better still, of course, would be an actual sea battle between the former allies that would give Pétain an excuse to turn to active collaboration with Germany.

The biggest obstacle to that development hitherto has not been the Vichy government, which is wholeheartedly anti-democratic and composed of men who, in effect, have bet their shirts on a German triumph, but the strongly anti-Nazi and pro-British attitude of the French people. That was the real reason for Laval's dismissal. He was so loathed and distrusted that no policy he advocated had a chance of approval. There is now reason to believe that the Nazis recognized this fact and that their apparent struggle to reinstate him was no more than an elaborate piece of stage play which served to strengthen the popular position of Pétain and to dissociate the comparatively unknown Darlan from his predecessor.

Every day, however, it becomes more certain that, whatever Frenchmen may come and go at Vichy, the Germans remain in charge of policy. The advent of Darlan has brought no change in official propaganda, which remains viciously anti-British. The whole blame for the food shortage, from which unoccupied France is undoubtedly suffering, is ascribed to the British blockade. Nothing is said of the German requisitions of food and transport facilities and of the economic effects of the barrier dividing France. Yet even so consistent an apologist for Vichy as G. H. Archambault writes in the New York *Times:*

"France in her entirety could be self-supporting in the matter of food, were there no line of demarcation . . . From north to south no supplies cross the line; yet the northern section is by far the more productive, particularly in cereals. How far supplies pass from south to north is not revealed beyond the indication that much fruit goes to Germany."

Replying to Darlan's threat, the British Ministry of

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Economic Warfare declared: "If there are any means of helping unoccupied France without helping Germany, the British government will always be prepared to consider them, but so far no proposal has been put forward." It is now known that last October London offered to discuss economic questions with Vichy on a *quid pro quo* basis. But the French government failed to pursue this opportunity owing, it is believed, to a Nazi veto. Recent dispatches from London make it clear this offer still holds, but it would not suit the German book for France and Britain to get together.

So now Darlan asks the United States to supply France with wheat and demands free passage through the British blockade. But he offers no concessions to Britain, no guarantees that food for France will not be the means of supplying aid to Germany, beyond a promise that the wheat in question will be consumed wholly in unoccupied France. Again and again Vichy spokesmen have bid for American sympathy and have appealed to this country for moral and material assistance. Clearly they are hoping either that Washington will put sufficient pressure on Britain to force a breach in the blockade or that a British refusal will weaken Anglo-American understanding.

According to Messrs. Alsop and Kintner "the best opinion" in Washington inclines to the view that the recent French move against the blockade was not made in Germany. Both the State Department and the President, they further report, have been working to convince the British "that something could be done about Vichy." If this be so, we hope that Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hull will make certain, before interceding further with London, that Pétain's government is not acting as a front for Hitler. Will they demand proof that factories in the unoccupied zone are not furnishing war materials to Germany? Will they ask why the Italian armistice control commission in North Africa has been replaced by German officers? Will they ascertain to what extent French diplomatic missions are being forced to carry out orders from Berlin? With regard to this last point we have recently been informed on first-hand authority that the French legation in Cairo has, on instructions from Vichy, acted as paymaster for German agents in Egypt and has forwarded to the Italian representative in Syria particulars of British military and naval dispositions. Any government which undertakes such tasks for other powers can hardly be regarded as independent.

We feel that, in the circumstances, the State Department ought to be extremely chary of accepting Vichy's assurances as a basis for urging Britain to make concessions. We ought rather to press on Marshal Pétain our view that a British victory is as vital to the independent future of France as it is to our own interests. Hence if he is expecting any help from us he must prove, at least, that his government is doing no more to assist Hitler than it is compelled to by the armistice terms.

Sherwood Anderson

BY FREDA KIRCHWEY

Guatemala City, March 12

I NEVER knew Sherwood Anderson personally until I met him eleven days ago on the Santa Lucia bound for Panama and the West Coast of South America. I had known his books since my youth; indeed, they were among the books that helped to educate me—into a sort of honest confusion about sex and social problems and life in general. You couldn't help liking the man who wrote those books; you knew him as a person of great integrity and warmth and generous feeling. And after that I met him two or three times at parties—the kind of parties that effectively prevent people from getting really acquainted. But I came to know him as a person only in the last week of his life, on the way from New York to Cristobal, where I was to disembark.

It was stormy the second day out and I was happy to find him and his wife, Eleanor, in the half-empty lounge. We talked for a while before lunch. Sherwood said he was on his way to South America to meet writers in several countries and to get closer to what was going on in various cultural fields. He was not on an official errand. Although he carried letters of introduction from people in the State Department, he was on his own, a writer going to meet his fellow craftsmen on terms of friendship and common interests. He and Eleanor and I talked about the baffling problems involved in creating quickly a strong hemisphere front, counteracting influences which had been allowed a long head start, and doing the job on a basis of honest collaboration and understanding, not on one of North American dominance. If ever a man was enlisted with his whole heart in the fight for equality and freedom and a union of the democratic forces in every country, it was Sherwood Anderson. But he saw the complications too.

The next morning he was ill. From then until we reached Cristobal, where he was carried off the ship on a stretcher and taken to the hospital, I saw him only for a few minutes once or twice each day. But I felt that I knew him well by the time I said goodbye to him on the afternoon we landed. Through those three days of pain and growing weakness, he was uncompromisingly optimistic. He dismissed impatiently the suggestion that he might have to go ashore at Panama to have a proper examination. While his wife worried about the limited facilities the ship could provide, Sherwood viewed his ailment with amiable contempt. He swallowed doses and endured treatments and came through spasms of pain without relinquishing his certainly that the attack would be defeated in the end by his determination to do what he had set out to do.

But perhaps he realized the seriousness of his condi-

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tion more than he admitted. On the fourth day out he told me, with an air of humorous solemnity, that he had considered dying a noble death in the line of duty and being buried at sea. The whole event would have been written up under big headlines with crossed flags at the top of the page. "Noted author dies while carrying out mission of friendship to our southern neighbors." I told him that I thought it a poor idea and he'd get only a column in *The Nation*. He said he had decided against it anyhow, preferring South America to even the crossed flags.

On the last morning he seemed better. The barber shaved off a three-day beard and the doctor told him he might sit out in the sun for a while. When I went in to see him he eyed me with a pleased expression. "I'm feeling fine," he told me. "What you said did it. One column in *The Nation*—that settled it! I decided to call the whole thing off." But at noon he was seized with violent pains and his temperature went up. A shot of morphine did little good. Eleanor made up his mind for him and the doctor acquiesced. She began packing their bags after lunch and the purser radioed the hospital at Colon for an ambulance to meet the boat at Cristobal. I saw Sherwood for a moment while the packing was going on. He was still in pain and still stubbornly cheerful. In a dismal attempt at lightness I said, "Well, I see you couldn't bear to go on down the coast without me." "You expect pretty costly tribute from your admirers, don't you, my girl?" he answered. "I'll let them examine me here at the Canal and do what they have to do and then I'll catch the next boat. They aren't going to spoil my trip." But I knew, and I think Eleanor knew, that Sherwood's journey had ended.

When I heard of his death three days later in Costa Rica, I felt as if I had lost an old friend instead of a recent acquaintance. I am glad I got to know him in that last valiant week of his life, for Sherwood Anderson had qualities that quickly drew him close to people he met. And I wish most earnestly that he had lived to carry out the mission he joked about. I can think of no other ambassador to Latin America who would have expressed more surely and naturally the characteristics we like to claim for our country—humor and friendliness and courage and a democratic spirit that is bred in the bone.



FAMILY GROUP

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O'Mahoney Sums Up

BY I. F. STONE

Washington, March 16

THE investigation made by the Temporary National Economic Committee under Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney in the past two years and nine months will rank with the great inquiries of the past, with Frank Walsh's Industrial Commission and Samuel Untermyer's Pujo committee. Like its predecessors, the TNEC has shown the extent to which this country and its institutions, to echo Lincoln, no longer belong to the people who inhabit it. The facts are vividly summarized in Senator O'Mahoney's final statement, a document which deserves to be read by every American. To a greater extent than ever before, our economy is dominated by the corporation rather than by the individual entrepreneur. These corporations are collective enterprises without collective responsibility. "In popular discussion," Senator O'Mahoney says, "they are regarded as 'private enterprise.' But how private is such enterprise after all?"

The Senator closed the work of the committee, as he began it, with "a declaration of faith in the traditional institutions of our country." But he makes it clear that when he says "traditional" that is what he means. He does not intend to endow monster corporations, which have often irresponsibly revolutionized our ways of doing business, with the basic immunities with which we protect personal property and personal liberty. "When one considers the number of policyholders who are the owners of mutual life insurance companies like Metropolitan and Prudential, wholly national in their operation and effect, the number of stockholders and employees of a utility like American T. & T., or of an industrial like General Motors, and the stockholders, employees, and natural resources of industrials like the Standard Oil of New Jersey and United States Steel, it becomes immediately clear that there is no justification whatsoever for thinking of those units or of dealing with them as though they were natural persons clothed with the rights which are guaranteed to flesh-and-blood persons by the Constitution of the United States." We have passed, in the opinion of the Senator, as of most intelligent people, "from an individual economy to a corporate economy" and must act accordingly. The alternative before us, he says, is "free private enterprise or government planning."

The chances are that the choice, as in most epigrammatic antitheses, will not prove a real one. Given time, a measure of good will, and a minimum of stability, and the solution will no doubt combine a good deal of both. The Senator himself is all for reviving free enterprise, i.e., enterprise free from interference by corporate monopoly as well as government official. But the possibility of turning back the clock is certainly a slim one, and his own remedy seems a puny one for so gigantic and revolutionary a change as has taken place since the 'seventies in our economy. He wants federal incorporation of all corporations operating in interstate commerce, a measure he and the late Senator Borah long championed. "The first and foremost step," the Senator says, "is to recognize that we must have a national rule for national business." With that none will disagree. Nor with his statement that "it is idle to think that the huge collective institutions which carry on modern business can continue to operate without more definite responsibility toward all the people of the nation than they now have." But one wonders whether he has gone to the heart of the matter when he says that "The Insulls and the Hopsons, the Coster-Musicas have been able to prey upon the economic system of all the people solely because they were able to secure the separate state charters which enabled them to engage in national commerce, although their creators had neither the desire nor the governmental power to regulate the commerce in which we are engaged." The railroads have long been regulated by the federal government, through the I.C.C., but that did not prevent the operations of the Van Sweringens.

One may support O'Mahoney's proposal for federal incorporation without having any great confidence that it would prove effective. The Senator wants a national charter law drafted so "as to reduce materially not only the possibilities of evasion of the anti-trust law but the difficulties of its enforcement." He wants this law written to "make corporate directors trustees in fact as well as in law." He would regulate subsidiaries through this law and "standardize intercorporate financing."

A steady stream of monographs has been issuing from the crowded archives of the committee. They are well worth watching, as are the concrete proposals put forward by its chairman. Given the complexities of business enterprise and the difficulties involved in even so seemingly simple a matter as the maintenance of competition, it is increasingly likely that some kind of administrative regulation will be necessary. Perhaps an easier way to keep the great collective enterprises of the corporation socially responsible would be to provide by law that large, widely held corporations admit the federal government into a share of their management.

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Who Are the Appeasers?

BY HERBERT AGAR

SPEAKING at Columbia University recently, Harold Ickes divided our appeasers into four groups: the native fascists, the German-American Bund, the Italian fascists, and the Communists, together with their fellow-travelers. The first of these seems to me to be easily the most important. The foreign organizations are only dangerous because America does not yet take the world revolution seriously, and therefore tolerates treason against democracy. The Communists are only dangerous when they can find some bandwagon to climb aboard. Left to themselves they are a small, confused, quarrelsome, discredited group. The real menace comes from our native, non-Communist appeasers. They can reach the big public beyond range of the Communists. They can reach the patriotic public beyond range of the foreign organizations. They are dividing and bewildering the country, spreading confusion on what is really a simple issue, preventing millions of our fellow-citizens from seeing that the revolution which rages across the world is aimed against everything for which our country stands.

With his usual bluntness Mr. Ickes calls these people "native fascists." I prefer to call them appeasers, not out of politeness, but because I think my epithet is more accurate. Fundamentally there is no difference, for I include among my appeasers all those whose words and deeds are helpful to Hitler. It does not matter whether, like Lawrence Dennis, they applaud the Nazi revolution, or, like Senator Wheeler, they deplore it. They are all giving aid to Hitler.

Before trying to classify our native appeasers, I want to repudiate the theory that it is unfair to ascribe motives to one's fellow-citizens in the midst of a life-and-death debate. I think it is not only fair but necessary to ask what makes a man like Lindbergh, or a man like Hoover, drag down his country's will to resist evil. While admitting that a complete answer cannot be given, I think that unless we seek at least a partial answer we cannot protect ourselves against the harm that these men do.

It has become a game among our adversaries—among the very men who call the rest of us warmongers and anti-Americans—to protest against any attempt to analyze the motives for their own beliefs. Mr. Dennis, characteristically, has been in the forefront of those who play this game. The rules of the game are that "anything goes" when it comes to undermining and discrediting and deriding democracy, or when it comes to ascribing the most bloodthirsty plans to those who would defend democracy all across the world, but that no harsh word must be used about those who would persuade us to accept that dark "wave of the future" which is symbolized by the new ghetto walls in Poland.

Dividing the native appeasers into sub-groups, we come first to those who sincerely believe in appeasement as a way out of the world's troubles. These people still think the primary fact about Hitler is that he represents the legitimate ambitions of a country that has been greatly wronged. They still think of the war mainly as an attempt to rectify these wrongs. Therefore they still permit themselves to think of a world in which America can do "good business" with Germany after a negotiated peace.

The unconscious motivations behind these opinions are strong. Once it is admitted that this is not a simple war for land or money, or for rectifying the Treaty of Versailles, but rather a revolution in which the stakes are the mind and soul of man, the implications are disturbing. They are especially disturbing for those who have kept themselves from knowing that the world of the 'twenties and 'thirties is dead, no matter what the outcome of the revolution. All the comfortable people who thought that we would some time, somehow, return to the happy days when there was no Roosevelt, no New Deal, no dangers that could not be denied, were given a rude shock by the fall of France—so rude, in fact, that many of them began at once to deny the implications of this awful event. The Republican convention was gathering at the time, and almost overnight the politicians agreed that it was unpatriotic to admit America's grave danger. Newspapers which a few months before had been pointing out the treasonable blindness of the appeasing governments of Europe now began to use the precise language which those governments had used. Why should we try to settle the affairs of Central Europe? Why should we assume that the Nazis had unkind thoughts about America? Why not mind our own business and attain "peace" by means of domestic "security"? The Maginot Line was gone; but there remained the Maginot Ocean.

While the affairs of Europe seemed safely distant, the American press was the most intelligent in the world; the best informed, and the most mordant about the follies of the foreign appeasers. But when the front line of the war left the fields of Flanders and moved west into the Atlantic, the American press began to sound like the press of London in 1938. And the American politicians began to sound like the politicians of Britain in 1934.

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It is not ignorance that makes sincere appeasers, that drives well-meaning men into befriending fascism. It is the awareness of a danger too great to contemplate. So long as we could persuade ourselves that our negligent society was good enough, that with all its sins it was still strong enough to survive, we were willing to see the evil in Nazism. But when France fell we had either to admit that our world needed to be reformed from the ground up or to pretend suddenly that the Nazi revolution was not as bad as it had been painted. Those whom I classify as the sincere appeasers, as the well-meaning native promoters of Hitler's revolution, are those who have accepted this easy way out. Rather than admit the sickness of our world, they minimize the wickedness of Hitler's.

Senator Taft is an example of this group. He is a sincere patriot and a man of wide knowledge. But he dare not see that Hitler has shown up the tawdriness of a democracy that is only in part democratic. He knows instinctively that the price of an all-out resistance to the Hitler revolution will be an all-out social and economic change at home. Believing that such change would be a catastrophe, he is forced to believe that Hitler does not have to be resisted, that by averting our eyes from the fate of all men everywhere we can snatch at safety in the midst of a perishing civilization.

"We know that in war there are no winners. . . . Don't let us suppose that necessarily there must be economic warfare between Germany and ourselves. . . . In my view there is room for Germany and ourselves in the trade with these countries." It sounds like Senator Taft today; but it is Neville Chamberlain in 1938. "Our will for peace is our first guarantee, our strength is our supreme guarantee. No matter what the circumstances, we are fully capable of assuring the inviolability of our frontiers." That sounds so much like Senator Taft that he has probably said it a dozen times; but the quotation is from Daladier in 1938. And in that same year Lord Halifax remarked, "Great Britain cannot be the policeman of the world."

Our Tafts, our Castles, our Vandenbergs, are repeating belatedly the phrases that led France to death and England to the edge of hell. On a lower level of intelligence, our Lindberghs do the same. I suggest that there is hope of winning some of these people to the truth. They do not plan to betray their country. Sooner or later they will all know their mistake—as Chamberlain and Lothian did before their deaths, as Halifax does, as Daladier presumably does in his French jail. The question is whether we can convert them before our country is either dead or dying.

The second category of native appeasers is made up of professional peacemongers. These I think are lost souls. They have now a vested interest in confusing the American public, and there seems no reason to expect them to relinquish their rights in this bad enterprise. They need not be consciously insincere; but they have attained a state of mental apoplexy which makes them impervious to evidence and which even deprives them of the knowledge which was once in their own minds.

The mark of this group is that its members make statements which no sane man could believe. Senator Taft has never said anything which Senator Taft might not believe. Even Lindbergh has never said anything which a Lindbergh might not believe. But those who belong to this group, such as Senator Wheeler, constantly make statements which their best friends must ascribe to overexcitement.

Senator Wheeler, because he went to high school, must have heard about the Monroe Doctrine and that it could never have been promulgated without British cooperation. Yet the other day he cried out in the Senate, "It's idiotic to say that we depend upon the British navy. We never have received any aid from the British navy." And Senator Wheeler, because he went to college, must have read about the British Empire. Yet he announced in the Senate that Canada is a "colony" of Great Britain and that the English king declares war "with Parliament not permitted to vote."

In the same speech in which the Senator made his nonsensical remark about the British navy, he told us that he has "never been under observation . . . never been in a hospital for the treatment of nervous diseases." If, therefore, we write off that excuse for his mistakes, and if we assume his sincerity, we are left with the conclusion that he must be overexcited. I suggest that the reason for this unbalancing condition is that the Senator has so identified himself with the cause of peacemongering that he can no longer tolerate the thought of a world in which that cause is lost. We have all seen similar breakdowns in the case of rich men and women whose "safe" investments have suddenly gone sour. It is not an experience which promotes the life of reason. The peacemongers, I think, will not be won to our cause in time to help save the world from destruction.

The third group of native appeasers is made up of the rabble-rousers, of which Father Coughlin is a pure example. They differ from the second group in that they are not committed to peacemongering. They are not committed to anything. In whatever field they can become a noisy nuisance, in that field they will operate. Father Coughlin has tried monetary reform, the New Deal, the anti-New Deal, the brotherhood of man, and anti-Semitism. Having failed in all these businesses, he is now setting himself up as a peacemonger. It is a mistake to call such people fascists—just as it would have been a mistake to call Father Coughlin a democrat in the days when he enthusiastically supported Roosevelt. Father Coughlin is a fascist only in the sense that

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Goebbels is a fascist: They are both first-class hog-callers, ready to climb on any bandwagon—and to climb off when the going gets tough.

The next group of appeasers consists of a section of the Catholic Church. The Brooklyn *Tablet* gives voice to the views of this section, and so does Father Gillis. I am not trying to apply easy generalizations to the Catholic Church. That institution is too large and too old and too complicated for the quick classifications of journalism. Furthermore, an important group of American Catholics is among the front-fighters of our anti-Nazi, pro-democratic cause. The *Tablets* and the Father Gillises of our country are partly motivated by the ancient undying grievances of the Irish. These grievances are rooted in centuries of oppression. Nevertheless, if the Irish continue to indulge these grievances today, at the cost of forwarding a revolution which denies everything for which Ireland stands, the Irish are merely one more neurotic people who deserve the slavery which Hitler is preparing for them. The huge majority of American Catholics can be won to the cause of resisting the Nazi revolution. Many of them are already among the strongest fighters on our side. There is no insurmountable "Catholic problem" in regard to appeasement.

Composing the fifth group among the American servants of Hitler are the men who are defeatist by temperament. This is a small group, in terms of spokesmen, but it is immensely influential. It includes Lawrence Dennis, who knows that he is helping the Nazi revolution, and President Hutchins of Chicago University, who thinks that he is not. These two men would disagree on almost every problem that faces our world; yet they serve the same cause and for the same emotional reason. The emotion that binds them together is a fatalistic despair over the civilization of the modern democratic world. Dennis is glad enough to see that world go, and to ride the wave of the future. Hutchins looks out upon his opulent campus from his office window and murmurs that it is all doomed anyway, the whole great plant will soon be useless, but we can at least win a few more years for thought and self-cultivation by refusing to become tangled in the woes of our neighbors.

Robert Hutchins, the sincere democrat, is more dangerous to our democracy than Lawrence Dennis, the sincere totalitarian. For Hutchins speaks to the youth of America and tells them that democracy is so corrupt it has no right to seek to save mankind. The guilt which all true Americans must feel when they survey the American scene has afflicted Hutchins with a moral impotence. There is no man who can bewail our sins more eloquently; there is no man who can state more persuasively the hopelessness of redemption. We are so wicked, he tells us, that we are unworthy to defend democracy. Until we have reformed at home, who are we to resist the revolution that enslaves man's mind and denies man's soul? There is no point of view that could more perfectly serve the plans of Hitler.

Finally, we have two American appeasers who fortunately do not represent a group and do not even agree with each other. Each of them stands alone in all the world, which is one of the few encouraging thoughts of our grim time. I refer to Henry Ford and Herbert Hoover. Neither of them could happen in any other country; even here neither of them has happened twice.

Henry Ford is a symbol of the American failure which so oppresses Robert Hutchins. In foreign policy he stands for ignorant American idealism, as in the peace ship, plus ignorant American isolationism. In domestic policy he stands for the failure to accept social responsibility which has made American individualism a term of reproach. Again he is not a fascist in a literal sense; he is a fascist only in that he represents one of the main reasons for fascism.

Herbert Hoover is also an anomaly. Hitler has no more stubborn helper in all the world, yet Hoover does not intend that this should be the case. In his incessant efforts to put over his plan to feed Hitler's Europe, Hoover is carrying on a one-man revolt against the foreign policy of the United States. Yet Herbert Hoover is not a friend of Nazism. He is merely an egotist who dislikes the Administration, dislikes the British, and loves to be world-important.

We cannot stay out of a revolution. We cannot appease it. We can only resist it, or accept it. And the American people will not with open eyes accept a world revolution that denies the hope of freedom. But we cannot describe the revolution without admitting that it is the necessary result of our own failure to make our democracy democratic. It is this admission, of course, which scares Joe Kennedy even more than Hitler's bombs. To Mr. Kennedy a democracy is a country where a lucky gambler can hope to make millions on the stock exchange. Incidentally, this is what the word also means to the men who coined the phrase "the corrupt plutodemocracies of the West." France fell rather than face the perils of attempting a true democracy. England began to move toward democracy when the knife was at its throat. Since that eleventh hour, since the war in Britain became a people's war, Britain has become the world's marvel. We too can rise to greatness, can rise above our appeasers, but only at the price of carrying on two struggles at once: a struggle at home to show we mean democracy, and a struggle abroad to resist the murderers of freedom. If we do not make the first struggle we shall not have heart for the second; and if we do not make the second we shall not have time for the first.

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

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

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

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An oil painting by ALEXANDER BROOK

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

8. ICE GLARE
A water color by CHAS. BURCHFIELD

Whitney Museum, Purchased for $800. Burchfield is noted for his sense of design and is often grouped with the older masters.

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A New World Literature

I. THE NOVEL IN INDO-AMERICA

BY LUIS-ALBERTO SÁNCHEZ

Like the majority of important Hispano-American writers, Luis-Alberto Sánchez, Peruvian, has had an active and varied career in addition to the fertile production of books. Before his exile from Peru, he was professor of American literature at the Universidad Nacional de San Marcos (Lima), the oldest university in the Americas. He was one of the most active younger allies of José Carlos Mariátegui, the great Peruvian revolutionary who gathered together in one movement the cultural and labor forces of his country, and who was cut off by death from becoming a formidable continental figure. With Mariátegui, he edited the famous magazine *Amauta* in whose pages the Indian-inspired art of José Sabogal and Julia Codesido appeared alongside literary texts which in breadth and depth of vision far surpassed the standards of *The Masses* and *New Masses*. After the fall of President Leguía and the death of Mariátegui, in 1930, Sánchez entered politics as one of the chief lieutenants of Raúl Haya de la Torre, founder of *Aprismo*. At the same time he practiced law, continued his teaching of literature, and wrote for the chief magazines of the Continent. *Aprismo* was suppressed and Sánchez was exiled. Except for a brief sojourn in Panamá, he has lived in Chile, where, in addition to his literary work, he is the editor of a leading publishing house.

Sánchez is an outstanding literary historian and critic; and his best in brilliance and scholarship is very good indeed. At little more than forty, he is the author of nearly a score of volumes, among them a history of the literature of Peru of which three volumes have appeared and *"Vida y pasión de la cultura en America."* His biographies have brought vitality to this undeveloped art form in America Hispana. Among the best are *"Don Manuel,"* a portrait of González Prada, Peru's great nineteenth-century Socialist-poet; *"La Perricholi,"* and *"Garcilaso Inca de la Vega,"* "the first creole."—W. F.

TO SPEAK of the Indo-American novel is to speak of something contemporaneous. Although it was born at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the Mexican Lizardi's *"El Perequillo Sarniento"* (1816), it cannot be said to have evolved seriously from there. *"María"* by the Colombian Jorge Isaacs (1867) and *"Amalia"* by the Argentine José Marmol (1852) are also more like ancestors than fathers of the Hispano-American novel. Its progressive systematic evolution begins with the splendor of the realists, more strictly with the naturalistic school, about 1880. Which is to say that our novel is only sixty years old—a contemporary in the fullest meaning of the term.

This is true not only of non-Anglo-Saxon America, but also of your America. A novelistic art cannot be said to exist merely because dozens of novels are published; but only when the novels achieve a common and progressing style. I feel that I must make this basic point (the theme of my book: "America: Novel Without Novelists") before I go on to present the state of the novel of my race in the new continent. As a common style and a durable expression, the novel in both Americas has had, indeed, little more than forty years of life. The precursors, however illustrious (a Hawthorne with you, an Isaacs with us) reveal admirable aptitude for the novel but not the *existence* of the novel as a literary genus, a collective cultural expression. The best proof of this is perhaps the pragmatic one: the average reader of a work of fiction will know by the mere text, the style, the metaphors, the mode of composition, whether the author is French, German, English, Russian; he needs as evidence the name of neither characters nor author. Is this true of the American novels before 1890-1900? I think not. They lack differentiation as a group expression of land or race. And more than any other literary form, the novel is a profound admixture of individual and collective elements.

More than any other literary form, the novel cannot free itself of its social medium; and requires both complexity and a social circuit. Where the population is thin, the novel rarely flowers. Like the orator and the dramatist, the novelist needs a dense audience. The poet can live on his own images. The novelist, although he shut himself up in a cork-lined room like Proust in order to re-live the scenes of his past, must have had beforehand much traffic with men, much friction in the world. If not, his novel will unconsciously approach the poem or the psychopathic confession. If the true role of the novel today is to replace the epic, its destiny leads it inevitably to dialogue and chorus. The interior monologue is really a stammering dialogue in which consciousness masks itself as "the unconscious" and the interlocutors take a single name to disorient the reader.

Our naturalistic Indo-American novel begins, then, at the close of the era of the great inter-American wars: those of Paraguay with the Triple Alliance (Uruguay-Argentina-Brazil); that of the Pacific (Chile-Peru-Bolivia), the wars of resistance to the Spanish reconquest, and of Mexico against the French forces of Maximilian. The "populist," quasi-sociological tone of this novel surely owed much to the sudden wide contacts of social classes in the grip of war. Thus only can be explained the

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unheralded rise of the indigenous novel of Peru, which until then had been put off by a kind of tacit conspiracy. Doña Clorinda Matto de Turner's *"Aves sin Nido"* reflects and prophesies a multitudinous unrest. Something similar occurs in Mexico where romances of the war against Maximilian flourished. The novel in Argentina had a different beginning. Sudden wealth sent an "élite" to Europe (1880-1890); and they returned drenched with Parisianism. The novels of Eugenio Cambáceres, Lucio Vicente López, Leguizamón, etc., reveal this new passion. *"La Gran Aldea"* of López ("the big village," of course, is Buenos Aires) was not only a work of literary art but a notable human document. Typical also was the gallicized *"Música Sentimental"* of Cambáceres.

Born now as realism, the novel makes its way and within a few years reaches something like maturity. However, it does not yet become a focus of strong, individualized lives; it remains liquid before the external. In all the major examples of the Indo-American novel, the objective world rules over the personal, over aspiration, will, and spirit.

THE INDIVIDUAL AGAINST THE LANDSCAPE

If one factor better than another explains our American soul and, by the same token, our novel, it is this impotence of the individual before the cosmos, before society, and before the landscape. The European (in his novel) dominates his medium; so much so, that when (as in the tales of the Abbé Prévost and Chateaubriand) he crosses the sea and penetrates the prairies and jungles of America, he cuts his own personal path through chaos. The American, son of this European, when he would interpret and master his own world, falls under its spell; is overwhelmed, and muted. Witness the catastrophe in such works as *"La Vorágine"* by the Colombian José Eustacio Ribera, in *"Canaan"* and "The Illumined Voyage" by the Brazilian Graça Aranha, in *"Doña Bárbara"* by the Venezuelan Rómulo Gallegos, in Zalamea Borda's *"Quatro Años abordo de mi mismo"*: the authors become bewildered and sightless catechumens under the overpowering mastery of the *ambiente*. In contrast to the Europeans, the natural chaos penetrates *them*, saturates and humiliates *them*. They are authors of great sensibility, of experience, even of wisdom: nevertheless, they succumb before the external world they have tried to picture. And this, in great part, is also the condition of the novelists of the United States; in their case the overwhelming jungle is not rural but urban—but on that account no less victorious over the artist who would describe it.

Of coincidences and discrepancies between North American and Indo-American novels, more some other time. Suffice it now to say that inferiority before his theme is characteristic of our novelists. One modern author, Eduardo Mallea of Argentina, scarcely gets out a stammer before his city, *"La Ciudad junto al Río inverosímil."* If Ricardo Güiraldes in *"Don Segundo Sombra"* and *"Xamaica"* moves free through his Argentine pampas, this is because in great measure his landscapes are domestic, his own personal property, features of his paternal ranch rather than of the common panorama.

It may be said that terror is logical before such jungles and such plains. But compare the attitude of Guillermo Enrique Hudson, Argentine by birth, Englishman by race, culture, mentality, and language. His books—"Purple Land," "Long Ago and Far Away," *"El Ombú"* are of Argentina; "Green Mansions" is an idyll of the jungle of Venezuela—reveal tenderness, not stupefaction. The author, in order to dominate, holds himself aloof from his landscape, detached from his theme; whereas our writers with mystical gesture merge in their land and its dramas. The essential difference leads to another reflection: so immature are our novelists that they have not yet won the capacity of contemplation which requires immunization from what is contemplated. This trait (it holds also for the North American novel) is that of richly endowed, impetuous youth which still believes in magic.

The case of Hudson and of that other Anglo-Indo-American, Cunningham Graham, who pillaged the same regions, brings us to a generalization. Both Venezuela and Argentina are plains, immense, desolate, infinitely promising. Both have known the days, not yet extinct, of the wild plunging horse flung into frenzied assault. Both have become the source of vital novels. But for different reasons. Argentina, like Brazil, has a sturdy novelistic growth because it is an evolving nation of numerous population and of opposing forms of country and city life. In Argentina we find a various novelistic fauna: social and historical, as in Manuel Gálvez; studies of creole genre as in Güiraldes and Fernando Gilardi; picaresque-rural as in Roberto Payró and Benito Lynch; tales of passion, agony, domestic struggle—even of domestic ingenuousness in the novels of Gustavo Martínez Zuviria who writes his books "that his children may read them." In Brazil are novels of equal variety in style and theme. Without pausing over the chaste, smooth form of Machado de Assis, one of the great classics of Brazil, let me note the extraordinary distances (within a national mode) between the solid symbol-laden form of Aranha, the restless and poematic texture of Jorge Amado, the subtle irony of Monteiro Lobato, to note only a few. In both Argentina and Brazil the novel is maturing within the still general Indo-American immaturity.

SOCIAL-POLITICAL THEMES

In Venezuela on the other hand, as in Mexico and Ecuador, novels (already numerous) cannot escape the direct social-political motive. The best of Venezuela (Dio Gil, Rufino Blanco-Fombana, Pocaterra, Otero Silva, even the later works of Uslar Pietri, Gallegos, Padrón,

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and, in the past, of Díaz Rodríguez) reveal their immediate inspiration in contemporary events; often they are *romans-à-clef* with direct satirical objectives. Those of Uslar Pietri, Gallegos, and Padrón do not come under this last stricture. *"Las Lanzas Coloradas," "Canaima,"* and *"Madrugada"* are good examples. In Ecuador the novel was tame and serene (*"Cumandá"* by Juan León Mera is the highest expression of this beginning); and in the past ten years has become a truly amazing voice for the country's social and sexual problems. Fernando Chávez writes of the Indians' exploitation in *"Plata y Bronce";* but his voice is timid compared to the passionate outbursts of Demetrio Aguilera Malta, Joaquín Gallegos Lara, Enrique Gil Gilbert, Alfredo Pareja (*"Muelle," "Baldomera"*)—all novelists of the Pacific Coast. In the high Sierra appears a political novelist, at times more propagandist than artist, Jorge Icaza, whose famous *"Huasipungo,"* for all its merits, seems to me inferior to his book of stories, *"Barro de la Sierra."*

Not different is the case of Mexico. The generation of 1927 wrote Platonic tales, from which immediate reality had been refined away. Such are the elegant pages of Jaime Torres Bodet *("Margarita de la Niebla"),* Xavier Villaurrutia *("Dama de Corazones");* now a generation more loyal to the drama of the land moves to the front. Jorge Ferretis confesses in one of his prologues that he is writing ethnography as well as fiction. Gregorio Lopez y Fuentes *("El Indio"* and *"Arrieros")* and Rubén Romero (*"El Pueblo Inocente," "Mi Caballo, mi perro y mi rifle"*) use the æsthetic weapon to get to the essence of their people. And the same is true of Mauricio Magdaleno in whose *"El Resplandor"* high skill and beauty give birth to bitterness. The same bitterness inspires the work of the most famous Mexican novelist of our day, Mariano Azuela, whose works (*"Los de Abajo," "Las Moscas," "San Gabriel de Valdivias,"* etc.) are scarcely songs of the revolution; or, if they are songs, they are accompanied by funeral drums; but not on that account less forceful and able. On the other hand, *"El Aguila y la serpiente"* by Martín Luis Guzmán is a series of straight, living revolutionary pictures.

Other countries of our world have other accents. (The reader will not forget that limitations of space force me to be extremely schematic.) I shall say little of the embryonic novel of Peru. We have good short-story tellers; first of all Abraham Valdelomar *("El Caballero carmelo"),* Enrique Lopez Albújar *("Cuentos Andinos"),* Fernando Romero whose promise is great *("Doce novelas de la selva"),* José Diez Canseco *("Estampas Mulatas").* Less good can be said of our novel, although one novelist of high quality has appeared, Ciro Alegría, in whose work the relations of Indian and mestizo are illumined (*"La serpiente de oro," "Los perros hambrientes"*). This is a theme of central importance in a country whose ancient Inca culture reached a splendid maturity and still deeply and visibly infuses the present. The novel of Peru is still a gesture, although titles are copious. *"Tungsteno"* by Peru's greatest contemporary poet, Cesar Vallejo, is a sketch for a novel. The talent and energy of the author save it perhaps from its inherent weaknesses; but neither its theme nor its frequently schematic and exhortatory tone justifies the enthusiasm, partisan rather than literary, that has greeted it as well as that other far superior tale, *"Fablo Salvaje."* The greatest number of Peruvian novels turn about the cant themes: anecdotes of creole and *zambo* life in Lima, or of stereotyped Indians of the Sierra. In this group, we must again mention Clorinda Matto de Turner whose precursor novel, *"Aves sin Nido,"* without the huge resonance of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," played a similar part in arousing our society by its pathetic picture of the humiliating condition of the Indians and the abuses of the clergy.

The war novel (after a whole literature inspired by the wars of Paraguay with the Triple Alliance, including a fine trilogy by the Argentine Manuel Gálvez) flourishes anew with the recent struggle in the Chaco. Both Bolivians and Paraguayans have striven to capture in pulsing pages the drama of their people. To be sure, this is a novel as yet too allusive and without horizons; both chronicle and story. Prematurely, Oscar Ceruto freed himself from the mere reporting of events, in *"Aluvión de Fuego";* and on the other hand Augusto Céspedes, also a Bolivian, has wrongly confined himself to the story. But there are beautifully achieved tales like *"Repete"* of Lara, the romances of Toro Ramallo, Baldovinos: a whole young forest of novels fiery, impassioned, and above all quick with sorrow and revolt. On both its Bolivian and Paraguayan slopes, the Chaco novel is revolutionary and of small comfort to the patrioteer. What stands out is the cruel sacrifice; the sense that the horrible battles of the jungle could have been avoided.

TOWN VERSUS COUNTRY

The Chilean novel presents the problem of the rival *foci* of town and country; and until the present, the rural work predominated. In this genre, Mariano Latorre, author of *"Zurzulita," "Cuentos del Maule," "Chilenos del Mar,"* has been unique and left a school whose best disciple is Luis Durand. Other important names in the group are Fernando Santiván, Januario Espinosa, Marta Brunet, Pedro Prado (more poetic), Rafael Maluenda, author of the delightful *"La Pachacha."* But today, the novel of Chile follows another trend. The rural novel was clothed in an apparent gaiety, gave a note of country holiday not unrelated to the gaucho novels of Argentina which painted happy gauchos like *"Don Segundo Sombra"* or contrite, sophisticated gauchos like *"Zogoibi"* of Enrique Larreta. In sharp contrast is the crude, rending pathos of the novel of the Chilean city. It begins perhaps with Baldomero Lillo, although already in the

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classic works of Alberto Blest Gana the urban anxiety appears. The workers' suburb, poverty, the loom of the factory, were already present in *"El Roto"* of Joaquín Edwards Bello—a novel twenty-five years old and still timely. In this vein belong significant writers: Alberto Romero, Juan Modesto Castro; and, among the youngest novelists, Nicomedes Guzmán and Juan Godoy, whose *"Angurrientos"* is a story of both city and field, of both the outward and the inward man.

This brings us to the basic question: Is there *inwardness* to the Indo-American novel? or does it consist principally of anecdote, episode, detail? Alas! the second is closer to the truth. In addition to the fundamental reasons for this which I have suggested, this externality has circumstantial causes. The writer of our continent is hampered by many social taboos, by a poor economic status, by his frequent need of a bureaucratic job in order not to starve, by the lack of a broad public, by his ineptitude for truly intimate confession, by the congenital American extroversion. We have no autobiographical novels; except certain aspects of the work of Teresa de la Parra, Díaz Rodríguez, and one or more partially emancipated writers. Nor do we produce memoirs; or, if we do, the authors think more of the effect of their work than of the need of sincerity. Without these ingredients, the truly lyrical, truly profound personal novel cannot rise. A few modern writers strive to appear intimate, but they fail to hide their purpose, which is to equivocate and deform the deep impulse of self-confession. But if we lack the authentic novelized autobiography and the autobiographical novel, biography itself emerges, distinguished, since 1930. Here, the success of the Cubans, Jorge Mañach, Felix Lizaso, has been considerable as well as that of the Uruguayan Telmo Manacorda, the Argentine Galvez, and the Mexican Martín Luis Guzmán.

ANTHOLOGY OF THE IMPOSSIBLE

If, according to Thibaudet, the novel is "an anthology of the possible," the Indo-American novel has been, paradoxically, an anthology of the impossible. Not in the fantastic sense of Jules Verne, nor in the sense of free imagination as in the tales of Stevenson and Jack London; but because with excessive delight it has abused its literary instrument to give voice to the most unrealizable dreams, at times to the most bitter animosities, and only rarely to purposive aspirations. Reality remains on the margin, reduced to servant, vassal, slave, of the author turned prophet—a most regrettable phenomenon.

In all of which, despite many contradictions and within an analogous incipience and simultaneous old age, the Indo-American novel resembles the novel of the United States; through its chaos, its indiscipline, its shouts and outcries in lieu of voice; lacking both the articulation of the word and of truth. But now that Europe also throws out its heritage of measure and gives itself to an orgy of inarticulate ejaculations, civilization begins to make us all alike. Sinking into chaos, the march of us all may be broken. A fecund pause may come alike to the Americas, to Australia, to Europe, to Asia, even to Africa. This forced truce in the disoriented forward lunge of life may well prove fertile. It may help us to get hold of ourselves; and then to place the right foot forward in the paths of the universal novel.

(*Translated by Waldo Frank*)

In the Wind

THE STORY is told of a Nazi agent who was captured in a Dutch East Indian colony and offered his guard a thousand guilders to set him free. The guard refused. The Nazi offered double the sum, and the guard hesitated. Taking this as a sign of weakness, the prisoner asked if the captor's silence meant that he accepted. "All right, you can go," said the guard, "I get half a guilder for every Nazi I kill."

IN THE REAL ESTATE section of the New York *Times* for March 13 the following headline appeared: Boris Karloff Rents East 66th St. Suite: Other Tenants Go to East and West Side Houses.

AMERICANA: A shining delivery wagon visits new inhabitants of Quincy, Mass., to deliver a free pair of silk stockings, face powder, a car greasing, a pound of coffee, a case of ginger ale, a suit or dress cleaned free, an alarm clock, classified ads in local newspapers, and flowers. This dispensation of the Chamber of Commerce is known as the Welcome Wagon Service and is being copied by many of the new boom towns.

A LAW CASE that has been tabled for ten years will soon be pushed to a final conclusion. It concerns one Abraham Friedman, a medical student who ten years ago was expelled from Flower Hospital Medical College in New York. Mr. Friedman will claim that the reason for his expulsion was his refusal to take an examination on a Jewish holiday. His lawyers and backers feel that if the college can be forced to pay damages they may succeed in breaking the back of the notorious anti-Semitism in medical schools.

EDWIN S. FRIENDLY, business manager of the New York *Sun,* recently spoke before the Advertising Club and condemned the use of misleading superlatives in newspaper advertising. Mr. Friendly cited five common examples. His speech was reported in his own newspaper on a page that also contained the advertisement of a large department store. All of Mr. Friendly's horrible examples were to be found in that advertisement.

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind —either clippings with source and date or stories that can be easily authenticated. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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A Native at Large

BY JONATHAN DANIELS

Schooling for Defense

THERE are also the children of defense. As everybody very well knows, the movement of young men into the camps has pushed the American army beyond the number of a million men. More men—young, middle-aged, and old—have moved into jobs in the increasing industries of defense. Their women have moved with many of them, the admiral's wife and the lady of the mechanic doing her washing at the rear of the trailer. Now the federal commissioner of education reports that, with their elders, 250,000 children have also been moved. The army and navy have joined him in asking for $115,000,000 to help local school boards meet the problem.

No friend of these children of defense will object if the expenditure per child on the basis of the figures given amounts to $460 apiece. That sum is only to help local school boards, though it will include new school buildings. It is interesting, however, that the latest available figures show that in the United States the average annual expenditure per school child in daily attendance was $83.87. The highest figure reported was $147.65 in New York, the lowest $28.19 in Mississippi.

As money is being spent for defense, I am not objecting to a little lavishness in expenditures for the children. But the children who are the last line of defense are certainly not all congregated in defense centers. Even the schools they attend in the camps and the factory towns are not in general more crowded or more poorly equipped than are those which millions of other American children attend. Indeed, if the estimate of the children in defense centers is correct, they are a smaller number than the third of a million children of the migrants whom Dr. Will Alexander, former head of the Farm Security Administration, reported were living in transient camps, trailers, tents, and squalid tourist camps before the big movement of defense started in America. Some of them undoubtedly have moved with their papas to the eagerly sought jobs about the new camps and the new factories. There are still others moving to pick beans and pull up beets.

And not all the poor school conditions are in the places to which people move. Some are behind them in the places they left. In September, 1940, Fillmore County, Nebraska, reported: "Our problem is one of decreasing population. Our people are moving from the farms to Iowa, Illinois, and Oregon. Several of our rural schools have been closed because the attendance would only be one, two, or three." Indeed, the first fact in America so far as its children are concerned is that the most children are in the areas where the population pressure on resources is the greatest. These children make problems which are not merely rural. In Philadelphia last June officials discovered that six or seven thousand children from six Southern states had come to the Pennsylvania city without their parents to attend the schools.

Like housing for defense, schooling for defense is, as the heads of the army and navy agree, a matter in which the federal government must assume responsibility. Increasingly, however, it is hard to see how such responsibility can be restricted to a few crowded defense towns. This has always been an America in movement. Defense has merely emphasized national responsibility to the nation's children in the few places where it is most dramatic, most appealing.

Education, of course, is provided not merely to meet the needs of the future of the children and the nation, but also to serve parents' contentment now. The best workers presumably will hesitate to take their children into crowded centers with crowded schools. Army and navy men, who are ordered to localities, presumably have a right to ask the government to see to it that their children have decent schools. I have seen some of the packed schools in the defense towns now and I certainly would not say a word against making them better. But the children of defense are not merely in the defense towns. Before the selective draft was instituted, the highest ratios of enlistments came from Southern states where the families are the biggest and the schools least adequate —from the areas which are providing the population increase of the whole country.

All I say is that schooling for defense must in any realistic sense include the schooling of all. Of course, the government should help the overwhelmed school boards in the towns it has crowded. But no dramatic, comparatively lavish expenditure in a few communities will meet either the responsibility or the task. There are not only the schools defense has packed but the schools it has emptied. And there is the whole body of the children of an America where the biggest families get the worst schools and hundreds of thousands of America's defenders tomorrow get no schooling at all.

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BOOKS *and the* ARTS

The Evil in Man

THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN: A CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION. I. HUMAN NATURE. By Reinhold Niebuhr. Charles Scribner's Sons. $2.75.

THE fact that man is parceled out by the play of forces in our modern societies creates an appeal to collective tyrannies. But precisely when man wishes to be "total," the state will never be totalitarian. The first necessity of our time, then, is to rediscover the total man and his definition. The undertaking is in some measure facilitated by the present crisis, for this crisis makes violently manifest, even to the most myopic eyes, certain terrifying potentialities of man, which other more stable epochs were able not to see, and thus hastened to deny or to repress.

All anthropology is therefore important today—and that which Mr. Niebuhr gives us is doubly so, for if one accepts his central thesis it furnishes the key to almost all the errors committed by modern *isms;* and if one does not accept it, it nevertheless forces the reconsideration of these *isms* in a hitherto neglected aspect: in their aspect of evil, essential, inevitable, secretly desired.

Mr. Niebuhr's point of departure is the Biblical conception of man: a being involved in finite nature but at the same time possessing the liberty to transcend himself ad infinitum, to understand himself from a point outside nature, outside his finite self, and, finally, outside the very consciousness of his selfhood. Hence "the essential homeliness of the spirit" in a finite world.

The first part of the book wages a battle on two fronts: on the one hand, against rationalistic systems, idealist or mystical, which lose sight of the concrete limitation of the individual; on the other hand, against the materialistic and naturalistic systems which lose sight of the liberty of man. The common denominator of all these contradictory systems reveals itself, finally, in their incapacity to comprehend the reality of evil except as an "error" related to a bad society, to a bad ethics, to a backward culture. But to ignore the essential reality of evil is to ignore the reality of man.

The only defect of this first section is inherent in the fact that it is concerned with a didactic exposition. Despite all the realism of the author, the systems appear sometimes as entities deduced one from another. This can impair the polemic value for their time of certain ideologies which were more often undergone than dialectically composed. But this reservation does not apply to the excellent analyses of Marxism and of romanticism which conclude the first section, nor to the second part of the book which is informed throughout by a penetration at once acute and moving.

Following Kierkegaard, Mr. Niebuhr sees the origin of sin in the essential liberty of man, in the "dizziness" and anxiety which overwhelm the individual in the measure that he discovers the contradictory possibilities opened to him by his capacity to transcend himself and by his natural limitation. "The temptation to sin lies in the human nature itself. This situation is that man as spirit transcends the temporal and natural process in which he is involved, and also transcends himself." Thus his freedom is the basis not only of his creative but of his destructive power—of his temptation. For the essential temptation "resides in the inclination of man, either to deny the contingent character of his existence (in pride and self-love) or to escape from his freedom (in sensuality). . . . It is not his finiteness, dependence, and weakness *but his anxiety about* it which tempts the man to sin." Sin is the inevitable abuse which man makes of his essential liberty, an abuse which shortly leads to the loss of his liberty. Sin then is neither a moral accident nor an error which could be corrected by a better education. Whether man sins out of idealistic pride, out of weakness in alienating his selfhood in the mass, in race, in sex, or in mystical nihilism, man lies to himself and knows it without admitting it. Moreover, this fundamental dishonesty is the only proof of the existence in man of the *"justicia originalis."*

Marx and Freud had already made us aware of certain attitudes of ambivalence or half-conscious dishonesty in our social or personal conduct. They came nearer than the bourgeois rationalists to the Biblical vision of man. But Niebuhr goes further than they in their own direction and thus makes clear the insufficiency of their systems. His critique encompasses, moreover, far more than the non-Christian ideologies. It also brings a radical accusation against the idealism and the complacency of a Christianity become the accomplice of bourgeois values which are essentially superficial, if one may risk that conjunction of words. An anthropology such as that of Niebuhr can become a historic factor, "active" in this sense, that it unmasks the fundamental weakness of our modern world: its naivete in the presence of evil. Why are our democracies so easily disarmed, helpless, and as it were fascinated before evil incarnated in Hitler? Why do they persist so stubbornly in seeing in him only an accidental aberration —which has the practical effect of putting to sleep awareness of the menace? Because the democracies are first of all blind to the evil which is also within themselves, to the nature of sin inherent in "the human situation in itself." The most open-minded of our intellectuals still recoil before what seems to them the greater extravagance: the Biblical affirmation of sin. This prejudice is explained in good part by the fault of Christians themselves who have held and encouraged the belief, for two or three centuries, that evil was a moral category, or that it simply comprised all who were opposed to the bourgeois world and troubled its easy conscience.

I have come to believe that the "essential superficiality" of the bourgeois world arises from the simple fact that our democracies—above all the American democracy—does not believe in the devil. But why do they not believe? Because of anxiety. Evil is a fact, but it is also a scandal. All of our modern optimism and perfectionism is in reality only a desperate flight, and as such profoundly ambivalent, before this inacceptable fact. And how can man not take flight and not lie to himself if he no longer has a vision of transcendent

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salvation, of grace? *Somnium narrare vigilantis est,* wrote Seneca. By the same token, to confess the lie inherent in the sin would be the act of a man assured of pardon. Beyond this point I have no answer. But I believe the question to be correctly posed.

Dr. Niebuhr clarifies many confusions and introduces a preliminary and indispensable order. One may think, to be sure, that lectures, even Gifford Lectures, are not a very redoubtable weapon against the demoniac forces—but essentially human, I repeat—which are now unleashed. But if these lectures are read, they will contribute vitally to an unmasking of the reality of the demon among us. And the first trick of Satan, as André Gide so profoundly remarked, is to make us believe that he does not exist. DENIS DE ROUGEMONT

A Tribute to Milles

CARL MILLES: AN INTERPRETATION OF HIS WORK. By Meyric R. Rogers. Yale University Press. $15.

MILLES is a sculptor of vigorous energies, high spirit, and remarkably fluent and graceful invention, an enthusiast with taste, and a folk craftsman of instinctive sophistication who possesses a genuine aptitude for bringing the eccentricity of the present imagination and the archaism of the studio out of their traditional confines into the public uses of the park, the garden, and the modern city. He is a designer of predominantly decorative and architectural inclinations, a stylist in the tradition of Bernini, Barye, and Carpeaux, who is saved by his mastery of scale and dramatic motives both from the refined pedantry that limited the work of Eric Gill and from the inflationary grossness that lamed the gifts of Bourdelle and Manship. His heroic sense has been redeemed from mere ceremonial grandiloquence by the realism of his humanitarian feeling and from rhetoric by a native talent for gnomic humor and the grotesque. He has never found his best expression in the purely monumental or serious subject. His ideal occasion is the fountain. He has taken the low tank or watering-trough of the market-place and the most sumptuous bowls and urns of formal gardens and built within their confines the most brilliantly mobile arrangements of figures and allegories, the most ingenious constructions of spouts, water-sheaves, and raining sprays, that have appeared since Bernini brought the Roman fountain-art to its height in the seventeenth century. His work in this line is as brilliant a correction of the stolid unaquatic masonry of Carpeaux and the French school as of the sentimental trivialities of English or American garden art. His mannerisms never approach insincerity, his allegory is curbed from Manship's violence by the charm of his modesty and realism, and once he had learned the lesson of Rodin's monumental style, he recognized his weakness in the epic and purely plastic orders of imagination early enough to draw away from that master and thus to save his own talent from the brutality of massive force that afflicted most of Rodin's disciples. He is a master of fancy, a national stylist of the first order, a superb decorative manipulator of bronze and wood, and one of the foremost craftsmen of our time.

All this is superbly illustrated in Mr. Rogers's volume, one of the most beautifully printed monographs on sculpture that have appeared in America. Its photographs lack the unity of style and brilliance of illumination that distinguished the recent Phaidon volumes on Michelangelo and Rodin, but they have been taken with sufficient care to exhibit the full range of Milles's inventions, technical methods, and the scope of his themes and motives.

They are far from showing all that Mr. Rogers claims for Milles's genius. He calls his commentary an "interpretation" but it might better have been called an homage or appreciation. It pays deserved honor to Milles's integrity, craftsmanship, and taste and to the personal courage of his career which has expressed itself in the variety and boldness of his public commissions, but it indulges so freely in an unqualified and officious order of homage that it misses a critical discrimination of Milles's talent and thus seriously misrepresents its special quality. Mr. Rogers writes in the language of a curator, and from curators we have come to expect little criticism. The remarks in his Foreword on "form" and "abstraction" may perhaps be taken as the axioms or prejudices on which the ensuing essay is based, but they are inert and mandatory beyond any usefulness. Mr. Rogers presents Milles as a master of "the paradox that is art," by which he means a revelation of "the essential simplicity of natural form so that we may be able to apprehend its infinite complexity." But this crude formulation only emphasizes what Milles falls short of and what Mr. Rogers has completely missed: the nature of genuine plastic authority and the special requirements of sculptural form. To compare Milles with a craftsman of his own type, sources, and purposes like Mestrovic is to see at once his shortcomings in vision and structural sensibility; to compare him with men of more intense humanistic or æsthetic capacities like Barlach, Meunier, Gaudier, Lehmbruch, or Rodin is to see how boldness of invention and ebullience of fancy can sap the strength of genuine plastic dynamism; to compare him with abstractionists like Brancusi is to set up a destructive antithesis of aims; to compare him, more reasonably, with the finest achievement of Maillol is to be abruptly reminded of what the central character of sculpture is and how far Milles has missed it.

His achievement is sufficiently secure without Mr. Rogers's extravagant claims and irrelevant arguments on original authority. The work of few modern sculptors can be more freely and pleasantly enjoyed, especially when Milles is working in his true medium and purposes. His Orpheus, Triton, Europa, Folkunga, Poseidon, and St. Louis fountains are among the most rigorous and graceful examples of public art in our time; his bowls, doors, and bas-reliefs are admirable examples of soundly applied structural decoration; the Rudbeckius, Swedenborg, Peace, and Swedish Tercentenary monuments sharply define his limitations; his isolated nudes and figures have difficulty in maintaining their formal independence; his recent "Nature and Man" figures in Radio City show, for all the beauty and intricacy of their woodwork, how badly mistaken his tendency to grotesque artifice can be. It is unfortunate that so honest and hearty a craftsman, so scrupulous a designer, and so genuine a revivalist of the best elements in the archaistic tradition should be made to suffer by the comparisons and references entailed by Mr. Rogers's extravagant claims in this sumptuous but critically uniformed monograph. MORTON DAUWEN ZABEL

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Countermine Against Hitler

HOW TO WIN THE WAR. By "An Englishman." Alfred A. Knopf. $1.25.

HITLER'S real secret weapon, the author of this book argues, is a political one—the disintegration of the social structure of his opponents. Analysis of his campaigns, beginning with that against Austria, certainly supports this view but there is all too little evidence that the controllers of British policy have made such an analysis and drawn the inevitable conclusions.

With a conviction that gains from the sobriety of his style, "An Englishman" shows how wishful thinking blinded the Foreign Office to the nature of the Hitler revolution from the beginning. Deluded by fears of Bolshevism, it treated Nazism as a rough but essentially conservative movement which could be placated and tamed by kind treatment. Even now, with appeasement dead and buried, the British government still hesitates to turn against Hitler his own methods of social disintegration.

Behind the German lines, even within the boundaries of the Reich itself, tens of millions of Hitler's victims provide explosive material for a democratic counter-revolution. This book sets out a program which could rally them to form a second, secret front against their Nazi oppressors. But to put this plan into action the British government must strengthen democracy at home by showing its willingness and ability to subordinate the rights of private property to national needs. And it must convince the people of Europe, whom it would attract to its side, that it is not merely aiming to restore the *status quo* but has a real alternative to Hitler's super-state.

In order to carry out a democratic counter-revolution, "An Englishman" suggests, three departments of the government must be entirely reconstructed—the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Information, and the Home Office. Writing obviously with inside knowledge, he explains how ill-equipped these departments are for the promotion of a dynamic policy. A particularly illuminating chapter is that on the Home Office which stupidly classified refugees as "enemy aliens" and thrust them into concentration camps. That mistake has now been partly remedied but Britain is still wasting exiled talent able to supply leadership for an anti-Nazi revolution.

Directed as it is at British policy, this book can also be of great value in this country, for all too many Americans still fail to appreciate the scope of Hitler's ambitions and the techniques he employs to fulfill them. I would criticize only its cursory and overoptimistic treatment of the Russian problem. If "sentimental hatred of Bolshevism" on the part of the right is a danger to realistic thinking, so is the sentimental affection of the left. "An Englishman" suggests that a *modus vivendi* with the Soviets may be found by confining the democratic revolution to the West and leaving Stalin to organize the East. Such a proposal can be based only on superficial knowledge of the Balkans. If we can trust such an authority as Stoyan Pribichevich, author of "World Without End," the land-loving, highly individualistic peasants of eastern Europe are hardly likely to be brought to revolt against Hitler's feudal policies by the equally abhorred alternative of collectivization.

KEITH HUTCHISON

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DRAMA

A Pretty Problem

WHATEVER else one may or may not feel inclined to say about it, there is no doubt that the revival of "The Doctor's Dilemma" at the Shubert Theater provides a very agreeable evening of irresponsible wit and satiric farce-comedy. Of Katharine Cornell's performance as the incredible Mrs. Dubedat I shall say something presently; the others range all the way from the superb (Cecil Humphreys as Sir Ralph) through the highly satisfactory (Raymond Massey as Sir Cecil) to the merely acceptable; but thanks to smooth and skilful direction the whole is blended so perfectly that one is hardly aware of the unevenness and comes away with the conviction that the play has been made to yield pretty much all that it can.

"The Doctor's Dilemma" is, to be sure, not quite Shaw at his best. It was written in 1906 between "Major Barbara" and "Getting Married" and, unlike either of these two, is one of those plays in which the author makes no really serious attempt to expound systematically a major tenet of his creed. Instead, as in "Candida," "You Never Can Tell," and various others, he merely uses an artificial theatrical situation as an opportunity to take pot shots at this or that and occasionally simply to show off. The result is something which even thirty-five years later seems a great deal shrewder and funnier than ninety-nine out of a hundred plays. It is also something which forces even an old pro-Shavian like myself to admit how right the stuffiest of conventional critics were when they complained that however much intelligence there might be in the plays there was no human nature in the characters.

In the present instance, it will be remembered, the inventor of a new cure for tuberculosis who is able at the moment to take only one more patient, is faced with the problem of deciding whether he will choose to save a worthy nonentity or a brilliant but scoundrelly young artist. The dilemma itself is more ingenious as a problem in casuistry than credible as a situation, and Shaw, faced as he so often is with the impossibility of choosing between his Nietzschian self and his Puritan self, does not even solve the problem. Instead, he escapes the necessity of doing so by making the doctor sacrifice the genius, not because the doctor himself has decided the question on the terms in which it is stated, but because he is mildly in love with the artist's wife and wishes at least to spare her the knowledge of what a cad her husband is. Worse yet, however, is the fact that none of the principal characters is credible as a human being and that each is merely a counter to be moved in any manner which will serve to state the situation and work out a solution. The artist himself comes straight out of the paper-backs and exists only because his creator informs us that he will take as his first premise a genius who is also a sponger and a thief. The artist's wife, though sometimes cited along with Candida to prove that Shaw could draw womanly women, is equally non-existent as a person. Perhaps there is no reason not to believe that she would reappear as the merry and now remarried widow of the last act, but there is also no reason to believe that she would. Like her husband, she has no psychological processes, merely gestures made in response to the strings which the playwright pulls. The play, as a play, might just as well turn out one way as another. The logic of the arguments is clear, the logic of the persons non-existent.

As a debater Shaw is superb if often unscrupulous enough. In its way nothing could be better than the dialogue between the scientist and the old Scotch doctor concerning the main point at issue. When the latter demands to know which his friend would prefer, a world in which all the pictures were bad and all the men and women good or one in which the pictures were good and the human beings bad, one laughs with sheer delight at the skill of a debater who has managed to phrase the question with such expert unfairness. But when the characters begin to behave instead of talk, even when they begin to talk about emotions rather than ideas, one remembers the old legend of Shaw as a brain without a heart. It is said, I believe, that the bravura bit which involves the artist's dying profession of faith was written to prove William Archer wrong in his conviction that his one-time collaborator could not write a death scene. Actually, I think, it proves him right. Dubedat's purple passage about his devotion to art is pretty good rhetoric. It would deserve an "A" if produced in response to an old-fashioned examination question beginning "Write an imaginary dialogue in which a Renaissance painter discusses Faith with Savonarola." But it is a rhetorical exercise nevertheless. It is less sincere and therefore less moving than the driest of Shavian witticisms.

This brings me logically to the only unfavorable criticism which I have to make of Miss Cornell's performance. She is charming as the merry widow of the last act and she succeeds beyond any reasonable expectation in her efforts to humanize the character she is playing, to give her some emotional reality. But I wonder if there is any use in making an effort to do anything of the sort. Jennifer Dubedat is at least as artificial as Congreve's Millimant. It may just possibly be a mistake to try to make her seem human. JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

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

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MUSIC

WHAT struck me first in Stiedry's performance of Bach's Passion According to St. John, and what delighted my ears—accustomed as they were to the sound of performances by the Schola Cantorum with eighty arrogantly indifferent, hastily rehearsed New York Philharmonic musicians—was the refinement and finish and balance of the combined singing of the small group from the Schola and playing of the excellent little New Friends of Music Orchestra. Later there was the superb effectiveness of the dramatic passages of the work: the narrative of the Evangelist and dialogue of Jesus and Pilate in recitative, the choral interjections and comments of the Jews. These gained primarily by the fact that Stiedry has spent most of his life conducting dramatic music in an opera house; the recitative gained further by the fine singing of William Hain, Mack Harrell, and Chester Watson, and by the use of the organ for accompaniment, which proved to be artistically advantageous as well as authentic. And whereas the Schola Cantorum's singing of the chorales in 1937 caused me to observe that "one will not expect it to sing as badly as Bach's congregation must have sung, but one will expect it to sing as simply," and to complain of "shading that I thought precious and out of place," under Stiedry's direction the chorus sang the chorales as simply as it did beautifully.

It was, in short, a performance that revealed the strength of the strong parts of the work. And it was one that, on the other hand, did not conceal the weaknesses of the weak parts. The work begins with one of those opening Bach choruses in which what would be impressive said only three times is wearisome when said the tenth time; and it was not the less wearisome for a pace that gave the music magnificent breadth but continued to do this for fifteen minutes—the pace, in other words, for a chorus one-third the length. And the arias were poorly sung for the most part by Herta Glaz, William Horne, and even Harriet Henders, whose voice has acquired tremolo and sharp edge in its upper register. The best singing here was that of John Gurney.

Beethoven's sonatas for piano and 'cello are not works for 'cello with piano accompaniment but dialogues for the two instruments; their proper effect is achieved only when they are played by a pianist and a 'cellist of equal artistic stature and with equal standing in the performances; and this effect was not achieved at the New Friends concerts at which one heard a powerful phrase that Feuermann had played on the 'cello with the force and authority of a solo artist played a moment later by Albert Hirsch with the meekness—however musically sensitive—of an accompanist. At an earlier concert it had been interesting to note that an artist who could phrase Schubert's "Wasserfluth" as Lehmann did could also come in a beat too soon after each piano interlude of the song. And at a later concert one heard Kipnis make superb things of Schubert's "Wanderer" and "Geheimes" and "Abschied"; then exhibit a lack of rhythmic sense that caused "Nacht und Träume" to fall to pieces and allowed excessive intensity to distort the shape of "Der Doppelgänger"; and end with a melodramtic "Erlkönig" that was sheer burlesque.

Among the March Columbia records that have arrived thus far is a set (X-187, $2.50) offering a fine performance of Mozart's "Eine kleine Nachtmusik" by Weingartner with the London Symphony, well recorded except for an excess of bass which can be eliminated only by a separate bass-control. I recall Bruno Walter's performance on Victor as excellent, but clouded by reverberant recording.

Then there is Mozart's String Quartet K. 465 (Set 439, $3.50)—one of the great six dedicated to Haydn. The performance by the new Kolisch Quartet is admirably sensitive, though to the point of being precious and mannered occasionally; and it is well recorded, with some of the surfaces of my copy a little noisy. But it hasn't the extraordinary tonal beauty and ensemble finesse of the Budapest Quartet's performance in the older Victor set, and is not as beautifully recorded.

Szigeti has recorded superb performances of Bloch's "Baal Shem," Three Pictures of Chassidic Life (Set X-188, $2.50), of which the first two, "Vidui" and "Nigun" (70743-D), are impressive examples of Bloch's writing. "Simchas Torah" (70744-D) I care less about; and the arrangements of Milhaud's "Sumare" and Falla's "Miller's Dance" on the reverse side less still. While I am speaking of Szigeti I might mention my disappointment over the characteristic discrepancy between promise and fulfillment in the WOR broadcasts: the orchestral accompaniments of Szigeti's playing have been ragged and otherwise poor; though complete concertos were promised the assigned half-hour period was sufficient for only the first movement of the Beethoven Concerto, and the other two were not played even the next Sunday; and there have been increasing amounts of the pretentious rubbish with which "Floyd Neale at the microphone" has disfigured WOR's broadcasts of serious music for years.

Barlow's performance of Dvorak's fine "Carneval" Overture with the Columbia Broadcasting Symphony (70739-D, $1) seems good; but if one gives the first side enough treble for fidelity and richness of orchestral sound one gets a horrible surface noise mixed with the sound; and from the middle of the second side, which doesn't have this defect, there is a drop in volume. The Adagio and Rondo from Stamitz's Violin Concerto in B flat (70747-D, $1), not very consequential music to my ears, are excellently played by Milstein and Balsam; but the first side is afflicted with a bad rattle. Suzanne Sten's tremolo spoils what her beautiful voice and fine musicianship accomplish with Mendelssohn's moderately enjoyable song "Suleika" (17264-D, $.75), and her singing of "Auf Flügeln des Gesanges" is somewhat explosive. Szymanovski's Twelve Etudes for piano Op. 33 and his Mazurkas Op. 50, well played by Jakob Gimpel (Set X-189, $2.50), mean nothing to me. Nor do I care much about Pinto's "Scenas Infantis" for piano, which Novaes plays well (17262-D, $.75).

B. H. HAGGIN

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FOREWORD

NONE of our readers, we hope, will pick up this supplement with the thought that we have cast aside the pencil of the reporter for the crystal ball of the prophet. Had that been the case, we should have devoted these pages to a clear picture of the one world to come and not to the hazy outlines of two alternative worlds, all hedged about with if's and but's and blurred by qualifications such as no seer could indulge in and still keep his clientele. At the very least we would have been able to preserve a nice balance in presenting our alternatives: a Hitler world of just such a shade of darkness, a democratic world of so much light and so much shadow.

Unfortunately for editors, not even probabilities are made to fit such molds, and for that reason the second half of our issue is less prophecy than program. We know from their pronouncements and from what they have already done in the conquered countries of Europe what the Nazis would probably make of this world; but what Hitler's potential conquerors would make of it nobody knows, not even themselves. In part this uncertainty is a reflection of the position in which the British now find themselves. The war, with its vast destruction of wealth and profound social upheaval, has already cut them adrift from the worn moorings of an anarchic capitalism, just as the Cliveden set feared it would. Economics does not retreat, nor will it suffer a vacuum; out of the disintegration of the old pattern something will emerge. The heterogeneous social forces enthe fight against Hitler make that something able. Opposition to a common enemy unites nents now but that is all that unites them, and conclusion of the battle the cement will dis- Then the kind of Europe, the kind of world, emerge will depend on the pattern into which the pieces fall the coalition of forces and their relative strengths after an exhausting war. This is hardly the sort of situation that invites prediction.

That a Nazi world will be black indeed while a Nazi-free world may be less black, may be gray, and then again may be white, is to be sure a very imperfect prophecy, and one which at first blush would scarcely seem worth so much emphasis. Its crucial point and saving grace, it seems to us, is that it does posit a world that *may* be white. We think the chance that such a world will emerge from a fascist defeat is good; others may disagree. But, no matter what the odds, surely a drowning civilization should grasp at whatever comes to hand without first arguing as to whether it is a lifeboat or merely a raft.

Normally it would be grotesque to give such stress to the obvious, but these are days when obviousness is condemned as conspiratorial cunning and myopia enjoys the status of a political principle. Senators who have seen photographs of Poland's best people hanging from street lamps, who know of the slaughter of innocents in the abattoirs of Bucharest, will ignore these Nazi horrors entirely and rant for days about England's failure to give India dominion status. Men who have seen Germany grind one nation after another into slavery while promising always to respect the integrity of its next victim are still fatuous enough to believe that Hitler has no designs on the Americas simply because he says so.

The curious thing about these people is that if you ask one of them point-blank which side he would rather see win the war, he will usually, unless he is Colonel Lindbergh, answer with some embarrassment that he would naturally prefer a British victory; but in a second he is off again with some juicy tidbit of British deviousness in the Boer War or some fresh insight into the Boston Tea Party. Rarely does he lift a finger to help the England he would feebly prefer to win, and those who do he bitterly denounces as warmongers.

Sufficient repetition has given this approach a certain effectiveness. Fascists, Communists, and some varieties of Socialist and pacifist, assiduously cultivate what amounts to mass dementia. Under their influence and that of the look-at-the-last-war school, people otherwise perfectly lucid affect an indifference to any distinction between the England of Churchill and the Germany of Hitler although the faintest possibility of their being forced to live in the nightmare land of the swastika

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would terrify them out of their minds altogether. Even to those rigid Marxists who take the "long view" that in the end Churchillism and Hitlerism must merge into identity since both are forms of capitalism, it should be apparent that one offers a chance to work for change while the other offers a repressive terror that far outdoes the bungling methods of any czar that ever lived.

The purpose of this special issue, then, is to do the obvious, to demonstrate what everyone knows, consciously or in the recesses of his mind; what the craven dare not face for fear of what it may involve; and what the unscrupulous rationalize away to satisfy their own political ends: namely, that it makes a profound difference who wins this war, all the difference between the certainty of death and the hope of life—even a life of our own making.—R. B.

Europe Under the "Master Race"

BY KONRAD HEIDEN

THE New Order of the Nazis is an attempt to secure to the world the blessings of war for the next thousand years. To comprehend its full significance, we must not be misled by the word "order." The Nazis do not believe in the permanence of law and institutions. Though they speak of the substance and extent of their future realm as the Reich, a term historically old and ambiguous, they do not envisage it as a solidly organized state with stable laws and boundaries. The Great Reich of their dreams is rather a seething volcano of forces out of which one particular force again and again emerges victorious.

The outside world ponders too much over the so-called programs of National Socialism and reads too much into them. The Nazi leaders proclaim and promise a thousand miracles in which they do not for a moment believe. They proclaim and promise a thousand other things in which possibly they believe, but which cannot be accomplished. And because even Nazis can't help telling the truth occasionally in the course of endless ranting, they once in a while say things which are wholly sincere.

Hitler's much-quoted statement "Man lives on war and must perish in peace" is a case in point. This is no hypocritical justification of conquest and pillage, but rather the expression of an almost religious faith in an ideal form of life. War, by the tenets of this philosophy, is no aberration or tragedy, but rather the rule and the good fortune of nations. It is, in the words of Ernst Roehm, "the fount of youth, hope and fulfilment at the same time." War, according to Nazi doctrine, is as vital to nations as bread, not because of the spoils of battle (although they are an incidental objective), but as a constant incentive to ever-greater accomplishments and to the highest development of all the forces needed for survival.

"Whoever would really wish from his heart for the victory of the pacifist conception in this world must devote himself by every means to the conquest of the world by the Germans. . ."
("Mein Kampf," p. 315.)

The New Order of the Nazis, then, does not envisage the establishment of a fixed and unshakable tyranny over the entire world, nor does it portend a thousand years' "peace" in which a minority exploits a tortured majority. The Nazis are not such dreamers as to believe in the possibility of an unchallenged rule by force for a thousand years. Plainly and simply, the New Order means a permanent state of war.

People unfamiliar with the Nazi way of thinking will find it hard to visualize this National Socialistic future. The Nazi finds it equally difficult to follow the workings of democracy. For him such concepts as freedom of opinion and equal rights have lost their meaning. All he sees in democracy is disorder, weakness, and degeneration of the state. Values which personal freedom provide are like ultra-violet light to him: he cannot see them, therefore they do not exist. In view of the intellectual abyss that separates the two concepts it is better to grasp the implications of the New Order by ruling out first what it is not.

The order which a victorious Hitler will impose on Europe will, in the first place, not be an order based on laws. One look at present-day Germany makes this clear. Its regulations, gagging and muzzling the citizen, have merely the outward aspect of laws. They are not universally valid—for the leaders can break them any time they please and proudly boast of this right; nor are they compulsory—judges can disregard them, limit

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them, or extend their application at will. And they are not definitive, for tomorrow's "law" may punish what today is permissible. Above all, they never bind the leader, but only those he leads. Nazi law, in short, is not a system of laws at all, but merely a system of orders not yet repealed. Thus it would be a mistake to anticipate from a Hitler victory a new legal code that would be enforced throughout Europe. The New Order will not legislate; it will issue military orders—indefinitely.

Neither can Nazism's New Order be looked upon as an economic system. It would not organize Europe with any idea of solving urgent economic problems, for National Socialism recognizes no urgent economic problems. Such questions are always secondary and can be solved "one way or another," as Hitler puts it.

Within the limitations set by this obliviousness, the Nazis would of course carry out some sort of economic policy in the conquered territories. It is highly probable that they plan to revise drastically the system of production and distribution on the continent. The location of key industries will almost certainly be concentrated in areas where the Germans themselves are concentrated and thinned out elsewhere in accordance with the Nazi scale of racial values. The nations which the Nazis regard as "inferior" would be confined largely to an agricultural economy designed to serve the "master race."

This same scale would be applied even more strikingly in the distribution of consumers' goods, and the Nazi classification of the European nations thus furnishes a likely indication of what the continent will look like in the event of a Hitler triumph. Roughly this "science" divides nations into three categories, which may be termed creative, receptive, and destructive. The most creative, of course, and therefore entitled to the highest standard of living, are the Germans themselves, the "master race." Second to them, by Nazi standards, come the northern nations, from England through northern France, Belgium, Holland, and Scandinavia, to Finland. While these are, in the Nazi view, less productive and efficient than the Germans, they are adaptable, receptive to creative ideas, capable of being entrusted with some of the productive duties of the continent. Under German tutelage they would continue to carry some of the industrial burden of Europe and they would enjoy a corresponding share in the available wealth. Some of the peoples of Southern Europe, notably the Yugoslavs and perhaps the northern Italians, would be granted a similar rating, but, for the most part, the nations of the Mediterranean coasts would fit into the lowest category and be treated accordingly.

State regulation of production would prevail throughout the continent; this would be the instrument for controlling the location of industries and consequently the standard of living in the respective regions. In no case, of course, would living standards compare with those

". . . forget such terms as humanitarianism, civilization, international rights, and international confidence. For us, Nazis, these arguments no longer have any appeal, since we long ceased believing in them." (Josef Goebbels; in a speech quoted in the New York *Times*, March 21, 1939.)

that predominated on the continent from 1920 to 1939, since National Socialist economy is geared to war production—first, last, and always. In four years Nazism produced the most gruesome economic system that any country ever called its own—Goering's Four Year Plan—in order to wage the present war. If the Nazis triumph, every part of the world under their domination is going to enjoy the blessings of such Four Year Plans. Each plan will vary, depending on the momentary distribution of political power, which, according to the Nazis, will undergo constant changes. This permanent kaleidoscope must mean the eclipse of business as a prime power in society, for only in times of stable political conditions, only when power is balanced and unable to cut at will into the orderly process of production, distribution, and consumption, can business assume its fateful role of shaping man's destiny.

It is natural that in a world in which three *Panzer* divisions can conquer half a continent, business should be reduced to a minor role. When it is realized what importance technology has assumed in Nazi plans, this "revaluation of all values" becomes clearer. The National Socialist considers technology to be the magic key to all economic problems; he himself, in his own view, is an armed technician. To the technician every material problem is theoretically solvable even though the solution has not yet been found and may possibly be found only after many generations.

The proposed New Order does not envisage a definite territorial reorganization of Europe any more than it does a new fixed legal code or a stable economy. Most people have very mistaken ideas of the territorial designs of the Nazis, and the Nazis do their best to encourage such illusions. They constantly allow "official" plans to leak out which they have no real intention of pursuing and they will resort to any political stratagem or improvisation, no matter on how gigantic a scale, to suit immediate ends. No one takes their non-aggression pacts seriously, and it is just as idle to be taken in by even so impressive a move as the forced migration of thousands of Germans from the Baltic countries. At first sight this migration on orders from Berlin impressed

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the world as the establishment of a permanent boundary between Slavs and Germans. Nothing could be more unlikely. Hitler is always ready to make a political gesture which costs no more than the private happiness of ten thousand people. The move was expedient in the process of humoring his Bolshevik neighbor. It looked more final than the most sacred oath, but Nazi methods can easily send hundreds of thousands of Germans into the Baltic states tomorrow to replace the tens of thousands ordered out today.

The principle to remember in connection with all Nazi commitments, territorial as well as otherwise, is that the Reich of Adolf Hitler considers none of them binding. The Nazis are realists. They reckon with power and draw up their plans accordingly. If the momentary distribution of power permits it, they will remove boundaries that hamper them; they will destroy or transplant whole nations, as they are doing at the moment with Poland, on a scale made possible by the supreme application of modern technology. This is what the Nazis mean by "dynamics."

Based on neither law nor economics, nor on territorial revision, the order which Hitler promises Europe is similarly rootless in a moral sense. This is not belaboring the obvious, for even an order which does not conform to our conception of morality may have moral authority by other standards. But force itself can never be a moral principle, for its very existence bars any moral influence. Power can serve a moral principle, but then it *serves;* in the Nazi world power does not serve; it rules.

Selection of the strongest is the real, in fact the only, purpose of the New Order. The strongest, once he is found, is going to attend to everything. Politics and war are his business, and to Nazi thinking the two are synonymous. I speak here only of that absolute politics which transcends material values and is pursued for its own sake, politics that does not serve an ideal or benefit a community, but aims at gaining and maintaining power. It is such politics that Hitler has in mind when in a confidential mood he talks of himself to his intimates and whispers raptly: "Yes, I am a man of politics." This is not the game of the run-of-the-mill politician, who may be a man of honor compared to Hitler's type and a useful member of society. This is the absolute politics, which uses everything—men, nations, even God—merely as a means to an end. And what an end!

Nobody gets as drunk with power as the man who controls a party machinery which conveys omnipotence. The party machinery of the totalitarian state is organized evil, for it raises men to god-like positions and lets them forget that there are stronger and more important forces in this world than they and methods that are better than theirs. It is this self-idolizing type of man that Hitler has in mind when he claims: "No one can understand

Germany's Peace Aims

"The German race—that is our faith! It has higher rights than all others. . . . We have the divine right to rule, and we shall assure ourselves of that right." (Dr. Robert Ley; quoted from Munk, "The Economics of Force," p. 70.)

"A new peace shall make Germany mistress of the globe, a peace not hanging on the palm fronds of pacifist womenfolk, but established by the victorious sword of a master race that takes over the world in the service of a higher civilization." (Alfred Rosenberg; quoted from Munk, "The Economics of Force," p. 24.)

me who is not a man of politics himself," i. e., who does not live for power alone. To select this type from the masses of the nations is the real objective of the New Order. The doctrine of race is designed to serve this end and the S. S., the Elite Guard of the Nazis, goes so far as to accept only members whose height is at least 5 feet 10 inches, on the theory that the qualities of the genuine leader are embodied most frequently in tall men.

It may be doubted that this selective system will be preserved. For service under a dictator involves the most unexpected tests, and in the long run neither race nor intelligence nor physical figure will be decisive. What counts most is the perpetual readiness to capitulate morally and unreservedly before any need of the moment. When Hitler, on June 30, 1934, slaughtered half of his closest followers, he preserved men like Himmler, Goebbels, Christian Weber, Adolf Wagner, Emil Maurice, and Wilhelm Berchtold, all types which, according to Nazi racial theories, are definitely "inferior."

In a society which worships success as the Nazis do, success will finally become the decisive selective principle as the result of a natural development. For a long time to come a racial elite may be raised, examined, and awarded breeding prizes, but the real ruling group will be as little identical with that racial elite as it is now. For a Nazi society is founded on war, and war selects leaders of its own. A new type of man emerges in our war-shaken civilization: the armed intellectual, the man equipped with the scientific-technical education of our time who suddenly realizes his power. We have only to look at pictures of the men who appear as envoys of the fascist and semi-fascist countries of Central Europe and review the guards of honor at Herr von Ribbentrop's diplomatic conferences to see the type to perfection, in threatening black with silver braid.

These are the frustrated men from among whom fascism draws its first recruits, men who have studied the

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primitive propaganda technique of the old revolutionary parties of the left and elaborated it into an infinitely more subtle and effective system. Their greatest force has come from the conviction that they are the flower of modern society and the firm belief that they therefore have a right to absolute rule. These are the men who are created by war and social unheaval. They would indeed, in Hitler's words, "perish in peace." If the Nazi vision of a future world of wars and revolutions is correct, we shall not escape rule by these men anywhere.

If on the other hand, we can trust our feeling that the world is aspiring, through convulsions and disorders, to greater unity and organized peace, then this type will not be long in passing into extinction. It is my own belief that we shall never reach this peace and unity unless all nations take a deeper interest in what produces these same men, a much deeper interest than they took—or take even now—in their governmental institutions. Nationally limited democracy seems no longer able to cope with the problems of this age and it is fast losing its appeal. Only a democratic organization along international lines —a world democracy—is appropriate enough to electrify the people of our times. But this goes beyond the scope of my article.

Notes on the United States, 1950

BY WALTER MILLIS

The question of what would happen to the United States in the event of a German victory lies in good part in the realm of prophecy, not of fact capable of scientific analysis. To treat it in conventional terms is to conceal the character of the question, and to end in an unmanageable welter of alternative hypotheses and conflicting assumptions. I have therefore adopted a familiar device which, if more dramatic, is probably better suited to the subject. We may be quite sure that nothing would actually happen precisely as here indicated, but if the assumptions are probable and the development consistent, this must represent at least the kind of thing which might reasonably be expected to happen, and so offer perhaps a better guide to present decisions than a more abstract and generalized discussion.

Here, then, is an imaginary document, written by a fictitious American who has played a prominent role in edging America into the kind of future which I believe a German victory would produce. The year would be, say, 1950.—W. M.

WHAT I am about to set down cannot be published, for obvious reasons. Indeed, it might be a source of serious embarrassment if even the existence of these notes should become known to the authorities; and I must begin with the warning that what follows is strictly for family eyes. But I have recently been thinking over all that has happened in the last half-dozen years; and I have come to feel that a personal account of my own share in them will not only make my position clearer to the family, but may even be of use as guidance at some future time when, perhaps, the present situation—shall I say, when the situation may have altered?

Let me say at the outset that it was in complete sincerity, and with absolutely no prevision of subsequent events or the effect they would have upon my own career, that I threw myself into the opposition to the so-called Lease-Lend Act in the spring of 1941. I thought then, and I think now, that enforcement of that act would simply have meant the condemnation of innumerable American boys to death on European battlefields; I also thought that it would have ended in enshrining the Roosevelt Administration as a permanent, demagogic, personal dictatorship over the United States. I certainly did not foresee the 1944 election or what followed; I had no idea that it would lead to the confirmation of our Permanent President or that I should be appointed by him to the new Congress. When I took the leadership of the Be Strong America movement, which secured the repeal of the Lease-Lend Act, I didn't know that I should ever profit by it personally, any more than I foresaw these more recent events which have now earned me the ill-concealed attentions of the G-Section.

However, all that was nine years ago. The repeal of the Lease-Lend Act, of course, proved the turning point of the war. I confess that I had hardly anticipated the suddenness with which the heart seemed to go out of the British; I was shocked at the London *coup d'état* only six months later and at the spectacle of the Mosley government jailing Churchill, trying to surrender the fleet, and going down on its belly to Adolf Hitler when he drove up Whitehall. They said it was the American "stab in the back" that left them no alternative; but we couldn't help that, and I still think it shows how unwise we would have been to tie up with a people so ridden with unsuspected defeatism as they proved to be. But it did present us with a definitely new situation.

It was that fall, you remember, that I was first called to Washington—originally as adviser to the Senate

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coalition that put over the repealer and afterward as special assistant in the State Department, when Roosevelt saw that he had to broaden the base of his Administration, since his own policy had suffered so shattering a defeat. It's hard for people to realize now how acute the problems were. It wasn't only the Japanese; there was Canada hanging in the air, and the Latin Americans. Of course, the latter question practically solved itself; with South Americans falling over each other in the rush for the German legations and trade missions, it was apparent at once that we might as well stop worrying about anything south of the Orinoco. But a lot of the export people couldn't see it at first, and that added to the confusion. It was already bad enough with the uncertainty about Canada, which served to tie our hands in the Far East.

I can see now that it might have been better if we had forced the issue with Japan while the Australians were still holding out at Singapore. If we had massed the whole of our own fleet against them, together with the British forces that got away from the Mediterranean, the Japanese would have had to back down, and we could probably have saved a big area in the Far East—India, the Dutch Indies, the Philippines, New Caledonia, with all their tin and oil and nickel and other resources—at comparatively small cost. But what could we do? Since the whole point of the new policy had been to stay out of war, we could hardly turn around and make warlike gestures on the other side of the Pacific. And there was always the Canadian problem.

ALONE IN THE WORLD

It was an astute move of Hitler's to refuse to hint anything about a Canadian peace, one way or the other; and don't forget that he had the Canadian divisions as hostages. The British fleet units that finally reached Halifax were clearly not good for much. At that time most of our two-ocean navy was still on the ways. If you added up all that Hitler might have been able to mobilize from his own fleet, from the sizeable remnants of the Italian and French navies, plus the captured British merchant shipping, and remembered that the *Luftwaffe* was now reinforced with everything that was left of the British air force, air industry, and base facilities, it looked pretty formidable. Some of our younger navy men may have been willing to take on the Japanese anyhow; but there were plenty of older and more cautious heads in the Navy Department who said that it was out of the question under the circumstances. Senator Cartwright made convincing use of their testimony to show that nothing could be done in the Far East until the Canadian business was cleared up; and by that time, of course, Hitler had intervened with his dramatic mediation between the Japanese and the Australians, and the German-Japanese Condominium was established. That effectively settled the question of all the Malay territories, and left the Germans in an unassailable position in the Far East.

Some said afterward that we should have opposed the Canadian peace, which came next. But the astonishing generosity of Hitler's terms pretty well cut the ground from under us: no annexations or indemnities, repatriation of the Canadian divisions, Canada to keep the British fleet units, and immediate absorption of surplus wheat stocks, with nothing in return except the disbanding of the Canadian Air Force and the restoration of St. Pierre-Miquelon to the Pétainists. The Canadians weren't going to turn that down. And could we have started a war over St. Pierre-Miquelon or the appearance of a German trade delegation at Ottawa, at a moment when peace was everywhere else returning to a war-torn world? We were not prophets, remember; we were simply practical men doing the best we could at the time to get out of the mess that Roosevelt had got us into. And though things may have looked reasonably safe on the whole, with the new army coming along, we were certainly not blind to the dangers.

I remember a conversation I had with Cartwright some time in December, 1942—it was at the maneuvers signalizing the completion of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions. The German Permanent Mission had just steamed up New York harbor in the *Imperator* (she had been the *Queen Elizabeth*), formally reopening unrestricted trans-Atlantic travel. The ship was jammed to the guards with German tourists, and half the tycoons in the country had booked passage for the return trip to see what the New Europe was like. There was a big parade and reception; everything went off a lot better than had been expected (for the police even then had found quiet ways of keeping the Jews off the streets), and the only unfortunate note was a minor riot raised by Fiorello LaGuardia, who afterward made himself so notorious that the G-Section finally retired him from circulation.

Commenting on the affair, Cartwright said that so far was so good. International trade was restored and was being put on a firm basis; there was peace everywhere in the world; while we already had ten armored divisions, with more to come, a big air force, and a growing navy. But he confessed himself worried. We were alone in the world. The Canadians, not to mention the British, naturally hated us like poison; from the Orinoco southward there wasn't one government not taking its orders straight from Berlin; we were running acutely short of rubber and tin; there was a ridiculous amount of squawking about the price of coffee, and we badly needed to get a real foreign trade going if only to cushion the shocks and dislocations which our economy had been taking. The trouble was that there was virtually nobody to trade with except Hitler, and since he controlled nearly everything we wanted to buy and had alternative sources—in Canada and the Argentine and Australia, and in the British and

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Western European factories—for nearly everything we had to sell, it looked as if the trading might be difficult. I observed that, to make matters worse, a whole lot of the labor people were already beginning to say that we had sold them down the river—since all the great rearmament effort and defend-democracy business had just wound up with Hitler running the world—while a lot of the industrialists, who had backed us against Roosevelt in '41, were beginning to ask what we were going to do about strikes and taxes. I didn't like the temper of the country; it was as if there had been a sort of moral let-down with the peace. Cartwright agreed. You see, we weren't fooling ourselves, even then.

It was easy enough to modify the Wagner Act in the winter of 1943, but that didn't help much. We only ran into the big strike epidemic in the defense industries that spring and summer. And I can say in the confidence of these notes that the Germans didn't make things any easier. They kept the trade negotiations hanging on a month-to-month basis, and only those who were on the inside of things can know how much trouble and anxiety that caused. They had their tourists and lecturers and industrial commissioners everywhere—along with the Americans coming back from the German culture tours—and besides the propaganda for the Hitler Order which all these people naturally made in public, there was a lot more of a different kind made in secret. There is no doubt that they gave a lot of help to the Communists in the strike epidemic; working through their Rome organization, they stirred up the Italian communities, reviving all the old Fascist organizations which had flourished in Mussolini's time, and we knew they deliberately precipitated the great anti-Semitic riots in New York and Baltimore.

Yet what could we do? We dared not jeopardize the trade negotiations; the rubber problem was really serious from a defense point of view, the more particularly as we were in a weak position in regard to the refugees and the press. These problems, as you may not know, were in fact closely related. Of course, we had practically every malcontent from Europe and Asia who had been able to get away ensconced comfortably in the United States. It was not only that they did everything in their own power to raise rebellion in their home countries; but they found easy access to our press, making it one of their most powerful weapons. It was amazing with what irresponsibility our newspapers—even some of the greatest ones—continued their assaults, not only on the Hitler Order but against Herr Hitler himself, after the reestablishment of peace. The Germans put it quite reasonably: without the refugees they might have overlooked the press attacks, and without the press they might have overlooked the refugee agitators, but with each abetting the other they could not safely do business with us. We either had to hand over the refugees or to suppress the excesses of the newspapers. It was an argument difficult to combat.

This was the real origin of the press law of November, 1943, though I will not deny that there were many other reasons which made it seem preferable, as between the two solutions, to proceed against the press—especially as a way of getting around the Constitutional difficulty appeared at just that time. This was provided by the conviction of Jay Darling, the cartoonist, on a libel charge based on a grossly impertinent drawing of Herr Hitler. (The German Consul in New York was behind the case, though this was not made known.) It seemed quite simple to extend the concept of libel sufficiently to sustain a law which would at least impose that measure of decency and control that was becoming, among all our difficulties, more and more necessary. I helped Cartwright draft the bill, and I still think the reform might have been easily and quietly effected if it had not been for the intervention of Wendell Willkie. When he raised his still great following to make a rabid issue of free speech out of it, a hue and cry went up. We finally got the law upheld by one vote in the Supreme Court. That was in the spring of 1944, and even the justices could see by that time how urgent it was on all accounts—foreign relations, labor, the Jewish problem, and the rest—but popular excitement had been roused by then to an almost unmanageable pitch. However, we at least had less and less trouble with the press thereafter; while Herr Hitler's clearly voiced approval materially eased our way with the German Mission.

THE ELECTIONS OF 1944

By that time the 1944 Presidential elections were looming before us. As you know, I had been a lifetime believer in the American constitutional system; and it had few more powerful defenders, in its whole history, than Cartwright. But it was that spring, I think, that both of us began to see some of its more deep-seated defects. For one thing, as a result of the virtual deadlock which followed the Lease-Lend repeal, it had obliged us to run the country for some three years by what amounted to a Senatorial committee—an agency utterly unsuited to the task. I confess we sometimes wished rather acutely for a strong executive leadership, like that which Roosevelt had exerted in his first terms; I have always said that one of the great tragedies lay in the fact that a man of such powers, about whose policies there was so much that was good, should have had his efforts nullified by the deep-seated distrust we all felt for him. It was chiefly because of that distrust that I opposed the Lease-Lend Act, and I have sometimes wondered....

But that is neither here nor there. We now had to elect a new President, and it couldn't have come at a more unfortunate time. The old Republican Party was in fragments, and what was left of the Democratic was held together only by the threads of patronage. We were

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virtually forced to set up the Be Strong America Party, and when John Smith, who had a firm grip on the ABC unions by that time, approached us, the last hesitation disappeared. I want to assure you, as solemnly as I can, that I had no thought of personal ambition in the matter; it was simply that there was so clearly no alternative. You see, we already knew what had really happened to the Canadian airfields and what was going on at St. Pierre-Miquelon; the big commercial air base in British Guiana was getting bigger and less commercial every week; while our two-ocean navy, that looked so colossal when we planned it back in 1940, seemed pretty weak, as it now came to completion, beside what the Hitler Order had produced in the meantime. The German Mission was as polite as could be, but not very helpful and wholly uncommunicative.

We simply had to have a strong party, ready to stand for order and responsibility at home, for rational cooperation with Herr Hitler, and for enough armed strength on our side to make a genuine cooperation possible. Both Cartwright and I thought at the outset that it could be managed without seriously affecting the essentials of the old system. Roosevelt, naturally, no longer counted. The press law, and the expansion of the old FBI into the Department of Information, had given us a pretty good control over the situation; while it was soon apparent that Hopkins and Willkie, who were dividing the reactionaries, the back-number "liberals," the irresponsibles, the refugee-lovers, and the Jews between them, would simply kill each other off. Other things being equal, it could have been handled easily. But the combination of the threatening international situation, the new defense program, and the election touched off—inevitably, I suppose—the one insoluble issue that had been hanging over our heads ever since 1941.

That was, of course, the financial issue—or rather, what the financial issue implied. In the early years of rearmament the enormous deficits had made no difference; everybody thought of them as temporary, while the idea that war might lie immediately ahead made everyone willing to sink his doubts or differences and let the future take care of itself. There was a rather marked let-down with the reestablishment of peace—I was troubled about it at the time, as I have already said—but all of our people were of course committed to maximum defense. Colonel Lindbergh was a tower of strength on the subject, and the Roosevelt programs were still running. But now they were running out, and it was necessary to undertake new and larger ones.

It was not only the size of the effort that had at last really begun to sink in, it was its *permanency*. The *Congressional Record* for the final years is, of course, no longer publicly available; if it were, you could see, from the violent debates over the 1944 service appropriation bills, the real nature of the dilemma. How were the new programs to be financed? It was obvious that the answer would determine the whole character of the economy for a long time to come. In spite of improvements in revenues, there was no hope that the existent tax structure would ever reach a balance on this new and permanent level of armament expenditure. The continued voting of deficits no longer concealed the fundamental economic readjustments implied in the process; people had come to realize that deficit financing was simply a confused and inefficient way of effecting the readjustments. To keep the armament effort going we had to contemplate a permanently managed currency, a permanently managed production system, with permanent priorities and control of investment, drastic redistributions of the tax burden, and very considerable sacrifices from everybody. There wasn't a vested interest in the United States that didn't see itself affected by the prospect, and there wasn't one that didn't find somebody to shout his fool head off for it in the babel on the floor of Congress.

PERMANENT PRESIDENT SMITH

The Germans deliberately made matters worse by the pressure they kept exerting on the supply of imported strategic materials. They had here a leverage out of all proportion to the quantity of goods imported. The tremendous costs, delays, and inefficiencies involved in developing substitutes were formidable enough; what was even worse was the irritating effect of all the minor shortages and economies on the general public. I don't know how much sleep I lost over the fiasco of the artificial-tire scheme, and the resultant scandal. I don't know how many times I damned the man who first invented coffee and enslaved our populace to that utterly useless beverage. Of course, a people with the brains and energy of the Americans could have solved all these difficulties; with only a little forbearance, a little willingness to make sacrifices, to accept voluntary production and priority controls—as they had accepted them in '40 and '41—and some common honesty about paying taxes, the republican system needn't have committed suicide. But the moral deterioration had gone even deeper than we realized. The trouble was that we had to ask these sacrifices and readjustments as a permanent thing, not just as an emergency measure. And I suppose, at bottom, our position was psychologically weak. The one end of our whole policy since 1941 had been peace; but here we had to ask all the exertions of a war. Well, you just can't ask a people to sink their differences and concentrate every energy on a war effort without some sort of present or prospective war to offer them. No man can make bricks without straw. The summer wasn't over before Cartwright saw that the time for *asking* them was going by; we would have to start *telling* them pretty quick.

As the Be Strong America national chairman, I was able to choke off most of the popular debate and keep the

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

Drawing by Ben Martin

The United States in a Fascist World

campaign pretty well oiled; but Congress, including all our own friends, was split from top to bottom and acting like a madhouse. The budget never was passed; and everywhere else the deadlock was complete. As you know, we only barely elected John Smith in November; as you may not know, the Be Strong America majority in both Houses, though it was big enough, was bitterly divided against itself. The conservatives wanted to demobilize the whole defense effort, make a final settlement with the Hitler Order, balance the budget, and "go back to the capitalist system"—as if that were still possible! Cartwright and the progressives insisted upon the clean-cut solution of boldly taking the powers necessary to the times. But Smith, who knew the terms as to domestic as well as foreign policy on which Hitler would naturally have to insist if the conservatives had their way, realized that both courses really led to the same thing in the end. And he made enough of the leading conservative Senators see it too. With no budget, we were living on month-to-month grants; the second and last wave of strikes was at its height; the anti-Semitic riots were getting completely out of hand; the German lease of the big Tampico air base had just been announced, while a squadron of "Canadian" long-range bombers was to make a good-will visit to Washington for the inauguration. Smith had the will to act—and he acted.

I have often thought since of the famous January 20 speech to the old republican Congress, which had just voted him full powers and abolished itself: "I was elected by no single party but by a movement—the Be Strong America movement—a mass movement of the whole people, and a movement not only as wide and as deep but as irresistible as the spirit of that people. In their name I say: America from this hour shall and will be strong!" So it stands in all the schoolbooks; but a lot the people had to do with it. He is our Permanent President now; he made me his deputy in the Appointive Congress, and I served him as loyally as I could through the next three years. But in spite of everything he has done, I wonder how strong he has really made us. It was the fact that I wondered a little too loudly, when the terms of our accession to the Hitler Order became known, that really lay at the bottom of my dismissal from the government. Though I have never spoken of it, I suppose you know how narrowly I missed being shot in the second "purge"—because I had begun to wonder whether there were not a good many elements of the old democratic system which it might have been wiser to preserve. This is a big country to run, in these hard, unhappy, and restless times, by propaganda and concentration camps. There is weakness in those methods as well as strength. I wonder now how long we can go on being drained dry

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for the sake of the Berlin profiteers and place-holders, not to mention the soldiers. They have already got 1,500,000 of our young men (at least that; the official figure is ridiculous) involved in Central China in their endless "Asiatic incident," and God—or maybe Heinrich Himmler—alone knows how many have actually died there. A little more of this and it will be worse than if we had let Roosevelt get us into the European War in '41.

At least, none of this is what I had anticipated. I know it is the required thing nowadays to say that it was all planned down to the last detail by the genius of the Permanent President and Cartwright. But it was not, and I have had to leave these notes to show that it was not. Because only in this way can I make my true position clear to my children. I am horrified by what I see around me; I am profoundly disturbed for the future of my country, and I feel that somewhere there must have been a mistake that might have been avoided. But if so, it was not and could not have been deliberate; I cannot believe that I was at fault. I, like Cartwright and the rest, never plotted the end of the old republic. As I have shown, we were simply practical men trying to do our best with a situation as it developed. Reviewing the whole record, there is no point at which I can see how we might have acted differently. Not one. Or only one, perhaps. I have sometimes asked myself what really would have happened if we had not killed the Lease-Lend Act. But that is the purest speculation.

The Fate of Latin America

BY J. ALVAREZ DEL VAYO

UNTIL about a year ago the illusion prevailed in Latin America, as in the United States, that the Atlantic Ocean would be enough to protect the Western Hemisphere from the effects of a Nazi victory in Europe. And just as in this country, the idea fitted admirably into the schemes of Hitler's propaganda office. In the case of Latin America, however, Nazi agents had a much richer field for exploitation than this false feeling of security; they had at their disposal, and waiting only to be manipulated, the deep distrust which certain Latin-American circles reserve for any action or proposal originating in Washington. As soon as the European war started, the "geopoliticians" and historians of the Third Reich set themselves with Teutonic zeal to the task of scrutinizing the archives for every unhappy fact that could be recalled to the minds of Latin Americans concerning their relations with the United States. From the Plata to the Caribbean the agents of Herr Goebbels went armed with profuse literature calculated to revive and deepen all the misgivings that preceded the era of the Good Neighbor.

But neither of these propaganda devices could be regarded as conclusive. After all, the sending of marines to Nicaragua and Haiti and even Grover Cleveland's insistence on the right of the United States to the last word in all matters affecting the Western Hemisphere seem curiously mild and archaic when compared with the explosions of force that have shaken the world in the past few years. Along with these tidbits of history, and with the soothing reminders about the width of the Atlantic, went a more potent appeal: the argument that only a Hitler victory could save Latin-American economy from complete stagnation.

Nazi agents emphasized that Latin-American countries not only had nothing to fear from Hitler so far as their independence was concerned, but would benefit hugely by the New Order in Europe. Latin-American goods that now found the United States markets hermetically sealed would flood Europe after the war, taking the place of exports that formerly came from the defeated "plutodemocracies." The exploited proletarian nations of the New World would free themselves forever from the humiliating tutelage of the Bad Neighbor of the North, and join the splendid New Order of the Have-Nots.

The undeniable economic difficulties of the Latin-American countries, most of which were, until the beginning of the war, entirely dependent upon European markets, provide the nourishment upon which this brand of Hitler propaganda feeds. Every prospect of genuine collaboration between Latin America and the United States is ridiculed in that considerable section of the press which has come under German influence. What the United States wants from you, Latin Americans are told, is that you should resign yourselves to a subordinate economy exclusively adjusted to the interests of American production. Never will the Colossus of the North allow your meats, your wheat, your cotton, or any other basic product of your economy to enter the United States if a single farmer of the Middle West or South thereby considers his interests impaired. You must renounce your traditional sources of wealth and devote yourselves in the future to doing the petty tasks assigned to you by American industry while your own population suffers starvation and death. And at the same time Wall Street will not cease to remind you of your debts. (Here Nazi propaganda scores an extra point by announcing that the hour

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of Hitler's victory will mark the liquidation of all debts, the beginning of a new economy and the end of everything that had to do with the old order. The United States can offer you nothing better than the prospect of adapting yourselves to the coarse egoism of its supercapitalistic system, the Nazi sales talk continues, while Hitler, by unchaining all the creative forces in Europe, will open undreamed of markets for your meat, your wheat, and your cotton. Politically, moreover, a victorious Hitler will be your best ally against the threat of hemisphere domination by the United States.

Unfortunately for those who were prepared to give a sympathetic hearing to such arguments, the deterioration of the chances of a quick German victory has obliged the Nazis to adopt a position of interference which is hard to reconcile with their former attitude of kindly patronizing. In the degree to which increased help from the United States to Great Britain threatened Hitler with ultimate defeat, his main interest in Latin America switched to an unremitting effort to sow unrest with the purpose of creating a diversion of the American effort. Totalitarian intrigues soon began to crystallize in a way that stirred a reaction on the part of non-fascist elements in the population and in several countries obliged the governments to take a more belligerent stand against the propaganda of the Axis powers. In the course of a year public opinion has experienced a remarkable evolution, much like that which has taken place in the United States.

Today, from Buenos Aires to Mexico the conviction is overwhelming that a Hitler victory would have deep and pernicious effects on the fate of Latin America. It is possible that exports to Europe would recover their previous volume and even go beyond, but business would be carried on only on the terms that Nazi Germany would condescend to allow.

To some extent this German domination, based on a potential victory, has already asserted itself. As early as 1936, in fact, the Nazis succeeded in drawing Brazil into a commercial agreement calling for the exchange of surplus coffee, hides, and cotton for chemicals and hardware. The deal proved beneficial to Germany and harmful to Brazil, in the one-sided tradition of all Nazi barter arrangements. Hitler had to rely on the Integralists, or Brazilian Nazis, to put the deal across, and he had to contend with the opposition of courageous anti-fascists, like Menotta de Pichia, who were still able to challenge the Vargas regime. With Hitler victorious in Europe, such commercial agreements will not even call for discussion. They will be imposed.

Nor, on the basis of past evidence, is it reasonable to suppose that such commercial relations would leave room for political independence. In the case of the Nazis, trade is followed by the flag rather than the reverse; and the flag in this case means the Gestapo and all those devices of conquest which respectable Nazi tradesmen introduced into Norway and the Low Countries by way of preparation for the ultimate arrival of parachutists and *Panzer* divisions. Among the very business men who would enjoy the favors of German commercial "protection" Hitler would find the financiers and supporters of this Fifth Column. He might well start by drawing a South American republic into the New Order—for example, Brazil, which is already far along on the Nazi highroad. From there he could extend his influence by the simple device of giving the other countries of the continent a choice between economic subjugation and eventual ruin. A series of totalitarian *putsches* would then be perpetrated to finish the last vestiges of democracy—and Simon Bolivar's dream of a strong, free, united Hispanic America would fade into oblivion.

But this Nazification of Latin America would place it in open conflict with the United States. Left alone in the struggle against Hitler, this country would find itself justified in adopting toward a German-controlled Latin America a more or less interventionist attitude. "Yankee domination" would become self-defense. It would be difficult even for anti-imperialists in the United States to expect this country to remain indifferent while Hitler transformed one Latin-American country after another into bases for intrigue, and eventual attack, against the democracy of the Western Hemisphere and against the United States itself. In the life-and-death fight between a victorious Germany and a United States determined to bar Nazi insanity from this part of the world, the Latin-American countries would become a gigantic battlefield.

The alternative to this dark outlook lies in the common interest of the two Americas in a victory for democracy. It is only through the defeat of Hitler and of everything

Senator Wheeler, Please Note

"Latin America—we shall create a new Germany there. We have a right to this continent. . . . We require two movements abroad, a loyal and a revolutionary one. Do you think that's so difficult? I think we are capable of it. We should not be here otherwise. We shall not land troops like William the Conqueror and gain Brazil by the strength of arms. Our weapons are not visible ones. It will be a simple matter for me to produce unrest and revolts in the United States so that these gentry will have their hands full with their own affairs. We shall soon have storm troopers in America . . . we shall have men whom degenerate Yankeedom will not be able to challenge." (From Hitler's "Mein Kampf"; as cited by Rauschning in "The Voice of Destruction.")

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that Hitlerism would mean as it grew and became permanent, that a policy of solidarity and of understanding could grow up between the Americas and put an end to the old differences and resentments. To this end it is essential that the Latin-American countries do not feel themselves placed in a position of having to choose between two evils. Particularly dangerous from this standpoint is the kind of talk which recently crystallized in Henry Luce's pronouncement on the "American Century," in which the United States is pictured as ruling the world of tomorrow. Any hint of an attempt at hegemony in that sense would arouse in the rest of the continent the strongest apprehension.

Going further, a healthy policy of inter-continental cooperation must take into account the by-no-means unreasonable sensitivities of Latin Americans. I know how irritated they are that their best men of science and their best writers remain unnoticed in the United States. Latin America has men of great value. It has always had them. A little capital like San Jose, Costa Rica, has a group of intellectuals that would do honor to any country. It was they who on the eve of the last Pan-American conference signed the courageous manifesto protesting the insolence of the German Minister who had openly attempted to induce the Parliament of Costa Rica to sabotage the Havana conference.

As far back as 1916 Georg Brandes, the great Danish literary critic, told me in Copenhagen that the first person in the New World who had become interested in his work was a Colombian—Señor Baldomero Sanin Cano. Still living in Bogota, Señor Cano is one of the best critics of our time, but I doubt whether there are more than six persons in this country who have heard of him. Nor have Latin-American scientists received the recognition they deserve. American magazines and publishing houses accept articles and books by European authors of doubtful merit, while superior writers and scholars of Latin America remain neglected.

This state of affairs has created a national susceptibility to German propaganda which the Nazis have known well how to exploit. In such an atmosphere of rooted mistrust, to speak of an "American Century" limited to the United States is to show a gross lack of perception.

A still greater mistake would be to underestimate the deep democratic feeling that pulses in the masses of Latin America, even in those countries where dictators enjoy the support of American high finance. Every battle for freedom—regardless of where it was fought—has won a generous response from the people of Latin America. We Spanish Republicans could forget only with great difficulty how the America of our language and of our blood was, in its heart, on our side during our titanic fight. The day the Republic was finally defeated was everywhere in Latin America a day of despair and sorrow. Naturally that fact escaped the attention of those who confound Argentina with the Jockey Club and El Circulo de Armas, or Colombia with the antechamber of the Archbishop of Bogota. Only in reactionary circles, where the Nevile Hendersons of the democratic nations used to move, was Franco the great favorite, as Hitler is today.

The Nazis know how to use the lasting influence of Spain for their attempts at totalitarian penetration in Latin America, but their task will be extremely arduous without the unrestricted cooperation of the Spanish Phalanx. Today Hitler can hardly rely on the Italian fascist groups to recruit sympathizers for the Axis. In some countries—Argentina and Brazil—the Black Shirts outnumber the Brown, and in other places, like Peru, Italian economic domination is greater than German, but the continuous defeats suffered by the armies of Graziani and Cavallero have considerably cooled the propagandistic ardor of Il Duce's followers. Mussolini's chief appeal now is to the cabaret singers, who have found in him an inexhaustible subject for caustic humor.

The hunger and terror that now prevail in Franco's Spain hardly give the Falangists a platform from which to address themselves with any authority to anybody. But the Spanish Phalanx throughout Latin America is composed of people who have easy access to high society, who enjoy the advantage of speaking Spanish, and whose many relatives in the country allow them to move in circles in which national policies are decided. The appointment of Serrano Suñer, the chief and soul of the Spanish Phalanx, as Foreign Minister has greatly favored the work of this branch of Hitler's Fifth Column. Spanish legations and Spanish consulates in Latin America today are mainly centers of Phalanx activity conducted by agitators who serve Hitler. When a Nazi diplomat is obliged to leave his post, as in the case of Dr. Otto Langmann in Montevideo, agents of the Spanish Phalanx take his place and continue his subversive work.

Officials of the Phalanx in Latin America, whether engaged in social aid or in promoting new football teams, have to swear an oath of allegiance to Franco. They must blindly follow orders from Madrid, where Señor Jimenez Arnau, national representative of the foreign department of the Phalanx, is entrusted with the delicate task of assuring the closest collaboration between Falangists and Nazis in the former Spanish empire. Arnau has full powers to appoint and discharge his subordinates in Latin America. On December 19, 1939, he named Genaro Riestra as leader of the Cuban Phalanx, although the Cuban Ministry of the Interior had already issued a decree outlawing that organization. A week later he dismissed Rafael Cuyos, provincial leader of the Argentinian Phalanx, for "lack of initiative and of genuine Falangist spirit."

During the past months the Phalanx has been working very hard in Latin America in favor of the so-called "Latin Bloc" (the most religious-minded Falangists pre-

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fer to speak of it as a "Catholic Bloc"), which would flourish under the benediction of Pius XII. Of Spanish origin is the idea of a union of the totalitarian or half-totalitarian Latin nations, including Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, under a symbol more attractive to Catholics than the swastika, which would assure at the same time the support of Latin America. During his stay as ambassador to Fascist Spain, Marshal Pétain was maneuvered in this direction. The high Spanish clergy, undoubtedly acting on instructions from Rome, converted him to the idea of a vast Catholic bloc to oppose Nazi Germany in the event that a victorious Hitler should treat the Vatican too harshly.

Nevertheless, Phalanx propaganda in Latin America in support of the Catholic Bloc is to be viewed not as opposition to Hitler but as one more factor in the general struggle against democracy. For the Phalanx the two major enemies are Great Britain and the United States. A Catholic Bloc would complete the anti-British as well as the anti-Yankee front. All those in Latin America who resent the Nazi persecution of Catholics in Germany and Poland, and who consequently reject the thought of marching behind Hitler, could thus be incorporated into a far-reaching movement which accepted fascist principles as the basis of future society without, at the same time, accepting the leadership of Berlin. This is an extremely dangerous maneuver which needs to be watched with the same vigilant attention as the talk of a "negotiated peace."

Latin America is by now aware that its fate depends largely on the outcome of the battle being waged in Europe and Africa. In some places the danger is more visible, more imminent, than in others; and the powers of resistance are weaker. National pride is a factor in minimizing the peril. To some Latin Americans it seems a disgraceful confession to admit the existence of a fifth column—as though it were one of those maladies which forbid discussion and must remain a closely guarded family secret. But the common man, in Latin America as elsewhere, realizes what endless paths of horror would open before him should Nazism succeed in infesting his country, and he knows how to counter-attack. A few weeks ago in Rosario (Argentina), a crowd rushed into a theater where Nazi sympathizers were holding a meeting, and in five minutes the show was over. Such indications of the public temper have lately become frequent.

It is this strong feeling for freedom, rooted in the masses of Latin America, that promises the greatest hope of a real inter-American defense against totalitarian penetration of the Western Hemisphere. In Latin America, as everywhere else, the fight against fascism cannot be entrusted to the half-fascists, to the defeatists, or to the appeasers, but only to those with an iron determinaion to liquidate Hitler and his works forever.

Imperialism, Old and New

BY ALBERT VITON

MUCH of the confusion in contemporary political thinking must be attributed to the tendency to use the same words to describe realities which, in spite of outward resemblance, are fundamentally different. British conquest and rule of "backward" peoples is called imperialism and Hitler's conquest and exploitation of "*minderwertige*" ("inferior") peoples is likewise called imperialism. What is more natural, then, than to equate the two? And to arrive at the conclusion that since this war is a struggle between rival imperialisms, there is little reason to support one side or the other? It is a struggle between an old, satiated, perhaps degenerate, imperialism and a vigorous, rising new one.

No doubt there is a hard kernel of truth in this analysis. Hitler is too cynical a nationalist to fight a world war for ideological reasons. German policy in Hungary, Rumania, Norway, and other countries shows boldly Hitler's utter contempt for his foreign ideological fellow-travelers. He has used his fascist followers abroad not as propagandists of a faith but as instruments in his policy of German domination. Berlin had no scruples about coming to terms with Carol after he had liquidated Codreanu and scores of other fascist leaders (it was Carol, in fact, who rejected the German advances), and the Nazis unhesitatingly betrayed their Hungarian disciples the moment it became evident that more could be had from the feudal, aristocratic Teleki government. Nor are the British fighting merely for ideological reasons. They are fighting for their own liberties and they are fighting to preserve the empire that makes them a great power.

This view of the struggle, however, has only a limited validity, for it ignores the wider implications. Concentrating on one small fraction of reality, it distorts the whole picture almost beyond recognition. The plain fact is that not all imperialisms are alike. There are fundamental differences which make some less of a social evil than others. There is a distinct type of imperialism, like

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the Spanish and Portuguese varieties, which might be called agrarian or feudal imperialism; French imperialism stands somewhere between this type and the kind of capitalistic imperialism developed by the Dutch and, to a far greater extent, by the British, who have added to it a democratic element almost completely absent in even the Dutch type; and within recent years there has emerged a totally new type which is best exemplified by German imperialism. The difference between these various types is not only one of degree of exploitation and oppression; the difference, I submit, is one of kind. Fascist imperialism is not only more cruel, more reactionary, and more oppressive than capitalistic imperialism, not to speak of capitalist-democratic imperialism; it is a throwback to primitive, barbarian exploitation, administered with all the efficiency of the Total State.

The evils of capitalist imperialism are obvious. It is inevitable that private profit should be its motive; hence low wages, horrible working conditions, the lack of interest in social services. Narrowly interpreted, capitalist imperialism can be almost as oppressive and as exploiting as the feudal type. The policies which the Belgian King Leopold I used to develop the Congo are a good example. There is no need to describe here the outrageous cruelties perpetrated on the natives, the inhuman exploitation, and the systematic terror of Leopold's Congo officials; anyone interested will find all the facts in the work of Morel, Hinde, Olivier, and others. And from an immediate capitalistic point of view, the Congo administration was a success. The Crown domain, Leopold's personal estate, produced a net profit of $16,000,000 during the ten years from 1896 through 1905. But fortunately for the natives, this type of imperialism is, in the not-too-long run, simply bad capitalism. It is self-defeating. What were the results of Leopold's reign of terror? The Congo was turned into a desert and a cemetery. Its population of 20 to 30 millions declined by 1908 to 8.5 millions. Thickly populated, well-cultivated regions were turned into arid wastes. But deserts do not produce dividends nor do corpses consume cotton goods and trinkets. After a few years of holocaust the country ceased to produce and became a liability. It has never recovered.

The British learned early the lesson the Belgians had to learn so painfully. They learned that far more can be extracted from the colonies by moderate, continuous exploitation of labor and natural resources than by robbing them of their accumulated wealth, which amounts to little enough. Moreover, they discovered that productive human beings yield profits not only by their labor but by purchasing the manufactured goods of Britain. They realized that it was to their interest not merely to have a large supply of reasonably contented labor, but to increase the productiveness of their subjects and to raise their standard of living. Only the British have known how to make an empire pay over the years.

It cannot be denied, moreover, that in some ways the natives have benefited from the British system. The standard of living has usually risen, although far too slowly; the processes of justice have been made available to all; education by precept and example has in the more primitive countries raised the native moral and cultural level; population generally has increased—much more rapidly, in fact, than has been good altogether.

Egypt offers an excellent example of the comparative benefits of capitalist imperialism, even when unenlightened by humanitarian social consideration. Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) was no doubt greatly concerned with protecting the interests of European holders of Egyptian securities. That was why he was sent there. But he soon discovered that Egypt could not be put on its feet without fundamental changes in its social and cultural structure. He found the country bankrupt and in chaos. The irrigation system—Egypt's life-bearing channels—was in a sad state of decay. Public works were almost solely for ostentation (the Khedive had built an opera with money borrowed at usurious rates and regularly engaged expensive European artists). Production was at a low ebb. Fellaheen were flogged with the rhinoceros whip, subjected to various kinds of *corvée* (forced labor), and brutally oppressed by tax-gatherers. Within an incredibly short period after his arrival Cromer had not merely assured regular interest payments to the European bond-holding swindlers (Britain was in no way responsible for the murderous debts) but was able to undertake a series of highly remunerative public works. *Corvée* and rhinoceros whip were abolished and corruption was reduced; and the life of the peasantry was considerably improved.

There is no need to attribute humanitarian motives

Nazi Imperialism Points With Pride

"Germany has in her protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia not only established peace and order, but above all, has laid the foundation for a new economic prosperity and increasing understanding between the two nations. England still has much to accomplish before she can point to similar results in her protectorate in Palestine." Adolf Hitler in a speech delivered October 6, 1939, as quoted in *Facts in Review,* October 14.

"The Nordic race has a right to rule the world. We must make this right the guiding star of our foreign policy." (Hitler in a letter to Otto Strasser, May 21, 1930.)

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to the great proconsul, although I am convinced that a purely materialistic interpretation fails to do him justice. Even if Cromer was primarily interested in safeguarding the income of European bondholders, in making jobs for deserving Englishmen, in increasing Egypt's production of cotton to feed Lancashire's mills, and in creating markets for British goods, the fact still remains that the great masses of Egyptians benefited from his immense, highly competent, and, from a personal point of view, unselfish labors. Production increased rapidly; import figures more than doubled; social services were improved and made available to the poorest; the tyranny alike of the pashas and officials was curbed. Above all, the idea of equality before the law—a revolutionary concept in the East—and equitable treatment in the distribution of water were established. Egypt is still dreadfully poor and the standard of living for 90 per cent of the population is still lower than an American can imagine; but conditions today simply cannot be compared with those prevailing when Baring first arrived.

The trouble has been that even Britain has not realized the full potentialities of capitalistic imperialism. The private interests of individual capitalists were made synonymous with the interests of the nation, to the detriment of both Britain and the native peoples. Low wages, lack of social development, and the laissez-faire doctrine which has been traditional with the Colonial Office have prevented Britain no less than the colonies from realizing the promises of the British system. Whereas the highly developed Dominions take annually £4 10s. worth of British goods per head of population, in the colonies and India each person has been able to purchase British goods only to the value of 4s. 3d.

But Britain, aside from being a capitalistic country, has also been a democracy. This factor has played a far more impressive role in British imperial history than is generally realized. Freedom of speech and press in Britain has meant that reformers, humanitarians, and socialists have been able to carry on propaganda against the inevitable abuses of colonial rule. In no other imperialist country has it been so easy to arouse public opinion and legislature against the deeds of colonial agents. Once aroused, Parliament was able to make its weight felt. Dozens of investigating commissions have been sent out in response to popular and parliamentary criticism; and as often as not they have made no attempt to camouflage the ugly realities.

Nor have the British limited freedom of speech and press to themselves. Colonials have enjoyed a surprising amount of both, and it has stood them in good stead. True, the amount of freedom available to Nigeria, Ceylon, or India cannot be compared with freedom as understood in this country; neither, however, can it be compared with the tyranny maintained by the French, Dutch, and other imperial powers. A newspaper has to call pretty openly for riot before the British will take action.

The far-reaching effects of these policies are obvious. The fact is that only British colonies have developed healthy political nationalist movements and have come to within measurable distance of self-government. It should not be forgotten that Gandhi, Nehru, and most of the other Indian leaders are the products of British education and training. Seeley and other nineteenth-century British thinkers pointed out that the greatest disadvantage of imperialist rule is that it destroys native self-respect and the capacity for self-government. We know now that this has not happened in the British colonies, primarily because the British permitted a considerable amount of freedom. All major colonial reform movements were born in Britain. Westminster was first (excepting Denmark, which did not count) to outlaw the slave trade. Slavery itself was first prohibited in the British Empire, as was forced labor for private purposes —a monstrous evil which continues to this day in certain colonial possessions.

All this does not mean for a moment that imperialism is justifiable or that it can become the altruistic, humanitarian, and progressive thing which its exponents say it is. Imperialism is inherently anti-democratic, socially static, and culturally sterile. Its oft-proclaimed promises will not be realized until it reforms itself out of existence. Fortunately British imperialism has begun to do just that.

It is precisely this promise of reforming itself out of existence that is the most hopeful feature of British imperialism. British imperialists have always proclaimed self-government to be the ultimate development of their rule. The day India demands free European political institutions "will be the proudest day in English history," Macaulay exclaimed at the end of his speech on the government of India in 1833. Again and again British statesmen have upheld self-government as the natural fruition of their rule. The promise has been all too slow of fulfilment; but it has not been a vain hope. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Eire, Egypt, and Iraq are evidence of that.

From the comparatively enlightened policies of the British Empire to fascist imperialism is indeed a far cry. None of the fundamental ideas which determined the lines of development of the empire operate in the German scheme. Like British imperialism, it inevitably follows the socio-economic pattern established at home. That pattern is fundamentally different from the liberal capitalistic pattern we have known, and its colonial policy will be just as different.

Fascist society is based on war. Both the economic organization and the social structure are carefully adapted to that end. Not only can a completely planned economy be operated best under conditions of permanent total

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mobilization but a militarization of society is considered by fascist theoreticians a good thing in itself—even if there are no wars to fight. In an economy organized for war, the standard of living must be kept to the barest minimum, and even then it is doubtful whether the economy can yield enough for permanent military needs. A large part of the productive man-power, moreover, will always be removed from production, while women, as befits a military society, will find their fulfillment not in the productive world, but as consumers at home. Total organization, in addition, requires a tremendous number of officials, supervisors, coordinators, administrators of all sorts, thus further reducing the number of men actually engaged in production. Fascist economy therefore faces an inherent difficulty. It cannot satisfy more than the barest needs of its population while maintaining a completely militarized, collectivized society; but failure to maintain such a permanent military state means the certain doom of the system.

That is the fascist dilemma; and imperialism is the basic solution—an imperialism governed completely by the military economy of the governing country. The conquered peoples will deliver the fruits of their labor not simply for the benefit of profit-seekers, but to feed a vast military machine and to maintain a tolerable standard of living for the "master race." The natural resources of the conquered territories will be exploited by hordes of slaves. Since the military machine in the metropolitan country removes millions of men from production, millions of conquered natives must be imported to perform the most menial tasks in agriculture and industry. As Hitler told Rauschning, the fascists will not repeat the errors of private capitalists, "who misused industry in the service of progress." They will use it as an "instrument not of progress but of dominion. It requires to be used as a means of dominion." "Following the enslavement of subjected races," Hitler openly avowed in "Mein Kampf," the Aryan will control "their practical ability according to his command and his will and for his aims."

There is no need to dwell here on the inhuman oppression practiced by the Italians in Libya and by the Nazis in the recently conquered territories of Europe. There is no need to tell here the monstrous tale of Nazi cruelties in Poland, where tens, probably hundreds, of thousands of peasants have been driven from the soil their ancestors have cultivated for centuries; to describe the fate of farmers and workers removed by force to the Reich, where their labor-power is exploited while they are degraded to the position of pariahs; or of leaders exterminated by the hundred to crush forever the morale of a nation. I need not analyze here the systematic campaigns against all intellectuals in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Holland, and other territories, where libraries have been closed and books burned, where most of the universities have been dissolved and even high schools closed, where writers, teachers, doctors, lawyers have been hunted, thrown in concentration camps, and often murdered. But I must point out that far from being aberrations due to peculiar war conditions, these practices are in reality an essential part of the new imperialism. Only by practicing these forms of oppression can fascist imperialism degrade the conquered peoples to the plane of serfs and slaves and thereby fulfill its essential economic function.

Just as capitalistic imperialism was affected and modified by the liberal-democratic culture of the governing countries, so the new imperialism is determined not only by fundamental economic considerations but by the cultural pattern as well. Basic in the new system is the concept of a hierarchy of races—a concept totally absent from the liberal-democratic scheme. British imperialists have certainly not been energetic in preparing their colonial wards for self-rule and independence, but even the most rabid British imperialists did not deny the theoretical equality of human beings, did not set up an immutable racial hierarchy, or claim that non-British peoples were inherently incapable of self-rule.

The decline and disappearance of democratic-capitalistic imperialism was foreseen by most students of the problem before the rise of fascism. Even in the early years of this century Hobson charted with much erudition and insight the inevitable course of its downfall. The fascist powers, if victorious, will give imperialism a new lease of life, and by all indications it will become an imperialism infinitely more brutal, more oppressive, than capitalist imperialism has been during the past century and a half. Nor will it have the saving grace of working toward its own extinction.

We Promise You Slavery. . . .

"We will introduce in our new 'living space' completely new methods. All soil and industrial property of inhabitants of non-German origin will be confiscated without exception and distributed primarily among the worthy members of the party and soldiers who were accorded honors for bravery in this war. Thus, a new aristocracy of German masters [Herrenvolk] will be created. This aristocracy will have slaves assigned to it, these slaves to be their property and to consist of landless non-German nationals. . . . German masters, accustomed to command and, in cases of necessity, to strike inconsiderately where striking is necessary, will be fine pillars to uphold Germany's rule of the world." (Richard-Walther Darré, German Minister of Agriculture; in a private speech delivered last May, reported in the New York *Times*, December 6.)

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Revolution by Consent

BY HAROLD J. LASKI

THE destruction of Mussolini and Hitler is essential to the salvation of Europe. But we shall not understand this war if we attribute its coming solely to the malevolence of these evil men. This war is more truly the second act in a vast world-drama on which the curtain went up on August 4, 1914. It is, in part, a struggle for world-dominion between old empires and new; in that sense those are right who speak of it as an "imperialist" war. But it is not an imperialist war merely. It is also a declaration of bankruptcy on the part of capitalist civilization. It is the proof that the operation of the profit-making motive can no longer produce either a just or a peaceful society. It proves that the forces of privilege stand in the way of that access to the potentialities science has now made possible for us; that, unless their power is arrested now, they will destroy, to preserve themselves, all the democratic institutions and procedures of freedom which have struggled so painfully to recognition in the last four centuries.

Anyone who examines either the aims or the record of Hitler and Mussolini is entitled to conclude that those who oppose them stand, by comparison, for liberty and democracy. There are ugly and evil things in our way of life; unjust things also. But there is nothing so ugly, so evil, or so unjust as the basic principles upon which the dictatorial systems are built. I can therefore understand why their overthrow seems to many in itself a sufficient end. But I am bound to remark that their overthrow will not, in itself, end the causes which led to their emergence; and that, unless we seek to deal with those causes, we shall find ourselves confronted by precisely the same grim issue about which we are fighting today. It is not enough to want victory; it is essential to want victory for ends that make possible an enduring peace. Those ends involve the need to reorganize the foundations of our social order.

The essence of fascism, whether in its German or its Italian form, is the use of the outlaw by the privileged to defend themselves against the demand of the masses for justice. That demand is made when the contraction of the economic system brings out the inherent contradiction between the forces of production and its relations. When a society reaches this point, capitalist principles cannot operate so as to satisfy the established expectations of the masses; and the latter then seek to use their political power to reorganize economic institutions. Their claims then become a threat to privilege; and its possessors, panic-stricken at the prospect of its loss, turn to the outlaws for protection against the threat. The outlaws then take over the state-power. But since they cannot, without a wholesale reorganization of property-relations, any more satisfy the masses than their predecessors, they are compelled to dictatorship in order to stifle protest. What is more, they are compelled to military adventure; for it is the inescapable necessity of all dictatorship to seek in foreign conquest the means of relief from domestic grievance.

The central problem for our rulers is that they should understand in time that we have reached an epoch certain to be as decisive in its results as that which saw the fall of Rome, or that which, with the Reformation, witnessed the rise of the middle class to power. We have now to plan the economic and social foundations of our life in the interest of the whole community, or to relapse into a new dark age in which the outlaws everywhere will rule us. A system which frustrates the possibilities of science, which condemns millions to poverty and ignorance, which maintains its authority by methods which are too often an outrage on human decency, cannot expect to secure for that authority the allegiance of millions who have no interest in its continuance.

Does anyone expect the working class of Poland to fight for the return of the Becks and the Lubomirskis? Are the Rumanians likely to attack their new German masters that they may return to the yoke of King Carol and Madam Lupescu? Will the Italians rise against Mussolini to restore that inept ballet of group-maneuvers in which Giolitti was the chief performer? Frenchmen are not likely to turn on the Pétain regime for a system in which the Two Hundred Families were driven into headlong panic and anger by social reforms as mild as those of the Blum government. And the masses of Britain will not be content with a victory which leaves the gains of life still to the Westminsters and the Bedfords, while the men and women of London and Coventry and Jarrow have no heritage but its toil. Our problem is whether we can use the dramatic opportunity of war to lay the foundations of a new social order.

My argument is not that military victory is impossible save on these terms; it is rather that, otherwise, military victory will solve none of the problems before us. This approach, I think, has two immense advantages. In the first place, it offers the prospect of a more just society; in that prospect there are hope and exhilaration, and these create that power to endure which is so vital in the

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present struggle. In the second place, it enables Britain to put before the peoples of Europe, above all before the victims of the dictators, the pattern of a social order with the promise of which neither Mussolini nor Hitler can hope to compete. Thereby England builds for itself an army of allies who, as the war deepens, will find no prospect of hope save in its victory; who will, as Britain moves to the offensive, become, as it were, the spearhead of its attack. Our task, this is to say, is the preparation of that European Revolution in which the overthrow of Hitler and Mussolini makes possible an epoch of creative liberation.



Ernest Bevin

The power of the dictators is built upon terror and victory; but terror can only maintain its authority by a continued success which destroys hope in its victims. My argument is that we can break the legend of their success, in part by showing that they can actually be conquered, and, in part, by the idea we place behind our military effort, by diverting to ourselves the allegiance men are compelled to give them. I am pleading, in fact, for an offensive of the mind and spirit parallel with the offensive of arms. I am arguing that we can shatter the psychological hold of the dictators upon their subjects by making the end our victory will serve seem to them the one road to a better way of life.

They do not feel certain that this is the case today. They will only be made to feel certain as our cause establishes its *bona fides* with them. This it will not do by the easy rhetoric of promises to be fulfilled when the war is over. It will do so only as they see that we really mean what our rhetoric is pledged to perform; and we can only give them that insight by the performance of the promises in which we seek to make them believe. In war the deed is the word. If we claim to be fighting for democracy and freedom, what better way is there of proving our claim than to broaden and deepen *in the midst of war* the democracy and freedom that we have?

I do not want to underestimate the magnitude of the changes this policy will eventually imply; obviously they are very great. They will mean, in the long run, a new social faith, a transvaluation of all values. I know, too, that to ask for their initiation by consent, as I am now doing, is to ask for the display of a magnanimity which is one of the rarest qualities in history. I ask for it, nevertheless, on two grounds. I ask for it, first, because, in any profound way, we cannot win the war without it; and I ask for it, in the second place, because there is no other way to the creative use of victory.

When we have beaten our enemies, we have to win their cooperation in the common task if our lives are not to be a perpetual nightmare. To end this war without the psychological basis of international stability is to have fought it in vain. Our task, if we can, is to find a common ground between parties which will enable us to effect necessary social change in terms of consent. To do so, we have to adjust vitally the relation of the forces of production to the existing ownership of its instruments. If we fail to do so, all the pre-war problems will descend upon us with redoubled force; and the costs of the war will greatly diminish our ability to solve them.

More than this. We have aroused expectations of social justice. We have exacted immense sacrifices, above all from the poor. We have praised the capacity of the common people heroically to endure immense sufferings, and we have promised them the reward of that endurance. We shall have to pay the bills for these. Either we pay them with the understanding that to meet them generously is no more than justice; or, if that understanding is absent, we shall move rapidly to a position where the differences between men on matters of social constitution cannot be accommodated in terms of reason.

If that tragedy occurs, we shall have thrown our victory away. For, on the domestic side, we shall have fought to maintain a democratic system without organizing the conditions in which it has the opportunity to function effectively. And, on the international side, internecine conflict here will be so grave a preoccupation that we shall lack the power and the energy to preside over that European reconstruction in which our leadership will be so obviously essential.

There is a remark of Peter Kropotkin's which offers us the formula that we need. "A revolution," he wrote,[1] "must from its inception be an act of justice to the ill-treated and the oppressed, and not a promise to perform this act of reparation later on. If not, it is sure to fail." That is the answer to those who want social reform to wait until after the war. We cannot afford to let it wait, simply because its initiation now is an essential part of the strategy of victory.

I recognize that we cannot embark upon a program which endangers the unity of the nation. I recognize too that the claims of totalitarian war mean that we can initiate only the beginning of fundamental change, and that the process will have to be spread over long years of peace. I urge that there are two circumstances which make the present moment a singularly propitious one

[1] I owe this quotation to Mr. T. R. Fyvel's brilliant book, "The Malady and the Vision" (1940), p. 115.

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for this adventure. The first is that war itself has compelled profound changes and so induced a mood in the nation that is prepared for great experiment. Crisis always breaks the cake of custom; and it is folly not to take advantage of the mood while it lasts.

The second circumstance is not less important. The formation of the Churchill government was not merely the replacement of one statesman by another. It was also the deliberate association of the organized workers of this country with the war effort; and it cannot be assumed that, in accepting that association, their leaders abandoned the principles which led them to accept the view that a victory over Hitler and Mussolini is essential. I do not for a moment claim that the Labor leaders are entitled to exact for their support the enactment of the Labor Party's program; granted our constitutional principles, that would obviously be an impossible demand. But I do urge that they cannot be asked to lend the vital support they bring merely to enable the Conservative Party to maintain the *status quo* as of September 3, 1939. They are entitled to ask for those changes which at once enable the war to be won, in that profounder sense that we are attaching to victory, and prevent its aftermath from degenerating into a sordid domestic struggle in which the fruits of a military victory for democracy are thrown away. They may, that is to say, legitimately demand now the discovery of that plane of political action which fulfills the conditions of an enduring peace. They are entitled to ask for its discovery now because the common people are now paying the grim costs of the war; and because the new mood of the public is so largely the outcome of the faith and energy the common people have put into the national effort.

If this attitude be accepted, it seems to me that we have at least the large outlines of a basis upon which to build. Obviously enough, in a war of which the detailed contours alter every day, no government can be expected, in the international sphere, to attempt to do more than lay down the general principles with which it will approach a settlement. Its end is enduring peace, and this is incompatible with the power of any nation-state to threaten by aggression the security of its neighbors. This must mean an international order the members of which abandon their claim to sovereignty, and agree that all matters of common concern shall be matters also of common decision. It is, I think, clear that the executive organ of that international order must control all armaments, especially aviation. It is clear, further, that tariffs, currency, migration, the standards of labor, the right of access to raw materials, and the use of colonial possessions are matters of common concern in which no state can exercise sovereign powers. In the light, further, of the years between 1919 and 1939, the power in the international authority to protect, under sanctions, the rights both of national and of religious minorities, and of individual citizens, so that there is, to take a single illustration, something akin to an international writ of *habeas corpus,* must be established beyond a peradventure. Great Britain must undertake to see that these principles are written into the peace settlement; that it is a settlement freely negotiated between equals; that its acceptability is not destroyed by either punitive indemnities or punitive annexations. And it is urgent to make it understood that, whatever the form of constitution in any state, its essential institutions must not violate the vested procedures of freedom. I should like to see Great Britain pledge the utmost it can afford from its resources to the reconstruction of stricken Europe; and I should like to see an emphasis from its leaders that, subject to the primary rights of their own inhabitants, it is willing to place those of its colonies not yet ready for self-government under international mandate.

Further than these general principles in the international field, it does not seem to me possible as yet to go; we cannot penetrate the hidden veil of the future to speak with confidence either upon the form of international institutions or upon the details in which the application of these general principles will be clothed. But already, by such principles, we are offering to Europe cooperation with national freedom as against the Nazi ideal of a European unity that is built upon the slavery of the vanquished to the victors. The new imperialism, in short, of which Hitler and Mussolini are the protagonists, must be met by our abandonment of that imperialism which regards colonial peoples as the fit subject of economic exploitation. And, if we accept this as desir-

Labor Minister Bevin Says:

"It is better to leave the masses untaught than to give them a double appetite, both of stomach and head, and then not to satisfy either. Things can never be as they were. The old age has passed. A new age has to be built." (November 21, 1940.)

"Britain and her allies are determined to produce a just order in Europe and to recreate it on the basis of freedom, free association, and equality. We will never tolerate again masses of unemployed or poverty. We will not recognize privilege or place. A juster scheme of things is our main aim." (October 27, 1940.)

"If a boy from a secondary school can save us in a Spitfire, the same brain can be turned to produce a new world." (October 10, 1940.)

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able, we must come to the peace conference with clean hands. We do not do so while India is a plaintiff before the bar of history demanding a right to self-government which we persistently refuse to recognize.

I cite India only as a symbol of the larger imperial problem; I add only that our good name before the world seems to me bound up with some such approach as this. But it is our handling of certain domestic issues which seems to me central to the future of the world. If we handle them wisely, we can, I think, as certainly lead the world in social and economic reconstruction today as we led it in and after the eighteenth century. If we fail to handle them wisely, whatever the military outcome of the war, we shall drift rapidly to social revolution in this country. We shall then have lost the war, since, if social revolution supervenes, it will be impossible to maintain the fabric of democratic institutions; and if they are destroyed here, they will, believe me, be destroyed all over the world.

What are we entitled to ask for from this government in the sphere of social and economic change which offers hope and exhilaration to the people and safeguards us, in the post-war period, against the danger that the forces of privilege will prefer their vested interests to those changes which are obviously required.

We need, I suggest, the recognition of five principles. We require the organization of a sector of industry, the content of which is vital to the national life, which is removed from the hazards of the profit-making motive. In that sector belong today the mechanism of national credit, coal and electric power, transport, and the ownership of the land. We need, second, a radical transformation of our educational system. We should abolish the present class division of the schools; and we should, at long last, establish free secondary education for all. It is important, moreover, to increase the opportunities of further training at the university level. We need, thirdly, a great extension of the public health system with special attention to the problems of nutrition. We need, fourthly, full safeguards that, after the war, the immense issues connected with the rehousing of the population shall not be left to the discretion of the ground-landlord and the speculative builder. We need, finally, the assurance that economic planning after the war will safeguard us against the recurrence of mass unemployment and those distressed areas which, like Jarrow, have been so long a grim reproach to the quality of our statesmanship.

It is said that the forces of privilege in this country will never accept a program of this magnitude. Those who take this view may be right. If that is the case, two inferences follow. The first is the simple one that, like the comparable class in France, the forces of privilege care more for their vested interests than they do for democracy. If they are unwilling to yield principles which provide the key to victory, then the inference also follows that, after the war, they will fight for their privileges against the demands of the masses; sooner or later, and sooner, I think, rather than later, that means social conflict in this country and, with its coming, the end of democracy. I do not assume for a moment that in such a conflict the popular forces would be successful. I only point out that, if they were defeated, we should ourselves become a fascist society and that we should then have fought a war for democracy in vain. Even if the popular forces won, a period would be inevitable in which democratic institutions would have to be suspended; and obvious contemporary analogies suggest that the price for their suspension is a grim and heavy one.

Such a program as I have suggested would begin, peacefully, the readjustment of the relations of production to the forces of production. It calls neither for the proscription of persons nor the expropriation of property. It provides the time for that psychological readjustment to great innovation which offers the surest basis for the avoidance of conflict. It would begin, in a real way, the mitigation of what Professor Tawney has called our "religion of inequality."

I do not say that without this program we shall not win; indeed, I accept the view that a world in which Hitler and Mussolini are overthrown is, of itself, a better world. But I do say that to overthrow them for so great an end as this program implies is to begin one of those great ages of expansion in which the spirit of man finds the opportunity of creative liberation. For this program goes to the root of the problem out of which the war came: it offers a real and continuous prospect of raising the standard of life of the masses. By setting our own house in order in a democratic way, I believe we not only serve our own best interests; we also set an example to others which, as our enemies begin to feel the weight of our power, they will not be slow to follow. "War," said Edmund Burke, "never leaves where it found a nation." Those who find unacceptable a program of this kind have at least the obligation to provide an alternative.

One final word may be said. I have argued that there is need for a European revolution and that it is the historic mission of Great Britain to inaugurate its coming. To many the idea of revolution is inherently a terrifying one; there is no path they will not tread in the effort to evade its onset. The answer to their fear is a simple one: the revolution is, in any case, unavoidable. By the fact that we have embarked upon war with the fascist states, its coming is assured; the only questions to be raised are whether its birth-pangs can be abridged and its purpose made beneficent. If the victory of this country were to be set in the perspective I have described, I think that abridgement and that beneficence can be secured; without it, I believe we shall enter upon an era as dark as any in the human record.

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Economy for a New World

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

ALEXANDER the Great, world conqueror and self-ordained god, when asked to unravel the Gordian Knot, slashed it through with his sword. Today Hitler offers a similar absolutist solution for the riddles of our tangled civilization. He would cure the curse of national egotisms by subjecting the world to one super-national egotism; he would end economic insecurity by reducing "inferior" classes and races to the status of human livestock. Our struggle now is to arrest his sword but, that achieved, we must set patiently to work to untie the knot into which the strands of society have been twisted, lest some new adventurer should once again offer the world a short cut.

What are the aims which must guide the builders of peace? No one, I think, has summed them up more completely than President Roosevelt, who, in his Annual Message to Congress on January 6, said:

> We look forward to a world founded on four essential human freedoms: The first is freedom of speech and expression—everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way—everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants—everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear—which, translated into world terms, means a worldwide reduction of armaments to such a point in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor—anywhere in the world.

Mr. Roosevelt's declaration emphasizes that peace and economic security are indivisible. There cannot be social peace within a democratic society in which large sections of the population have votes but not enough to eat; there cannot be international peace in a world sharply divided between Have and Have-Not nations. Thus it is hopeless to discuss the restoration of peace in purely political terms. That was the cardinal error of Versailles, which politically did represent an attempt to provide independence for all major national groups in Europe and did succeed in leaving fewer minorities under alien control than ever before. What it overlooked was the fact that a self-determining unit is not the same thing as a self-supporting unit; it took no steps to prevent the building of new economic barriers at the very moment when advances in technology were insistently demanding wider spheres of action. Had Europe in 1919 been united in one great free-trade area it is just conceivable that its already-decaying capitalism would have received a new lease of life and that, after a comparatively short period of adjustment, a period of economic development might have followed, comparable to that enjoyed by the United States in the nineteenth century.

Be that as it may, during the past twenty years or so economic organization, national and international, has been so violently distorted that laissez-faire could not provide even a temporary cure. The chronic alcoholic suddenly bereft of all stimulants suffers a complete nervous collapse. Checked by tariffs, quotas, embargoes, and exchange manipulations, international trade has ceased to be a means of widening the benefits of the division of labor and degenerated to a weapon. Under cover of these and other protective devices, private enterprise escaped from the discipline of competition, which was its basic economic justification, to snatch the forbidden fruit of monopoly. But, since that involved a futile effort to maintain profits by restricted production, it led to widespread unemployment and to an irresistible popular demand for government intervention. In Germany and Italy the monopolists sought to solve their dilemma by buying protection from gangsters only to find that after they had obtained relief from democratic pressure they themselves had to submit to involuntary servitude. In the Western democracies, the crisis was cushioned by greater accumulated wealth and stronger constitutional traditions, but here we encounter the phenomenon of the investor who has become allergic to risks and prizes liquidity above dividends.

With private enterprise already partially atrophied as a method of procuring the optimum production and distribution of wealth, we can hardly expect it to show greater resilience at the end of the war. The economics of modern warfare cannot be engined by the profit motive except by resorting to inflation and so enabling the government, with its inexhaustible buying power, to outbid private consumers in attracting to its service all the production it requires. This was the method largely relied upon in the last war and the results were hardly propitious even from the capitalist point of view. Today it would involve an even greater degree of inflation, since the necessities of war demand a still greater proportion of national production. Thus even Britain has almost completely abandoned "business as usual" and is now operating a planned economy.

Can such planning be discarded when the world is

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able to turn to the economic problems of peace and reconstruction? Can we rely on the profit motive to rebuild the cities that have been shattered, to restore communications, to return the millions of refugees or resettle them in new homes, and to provide a secure existence for all so that international peace is not broken by civil strife? Even the staunchest defender of private enterprise, even Mr. Mark Sullivan, would answer that there must be some measure of government intervention, some degree of centralized planning, and, I would add, the relegation of private property rights to a place of secondary importance.

Let me illustrate by considering briefly the problems involved in rebuilding London and other British cities. The task is not merely to restore them as they were but to seize the opportunity to rid them of slums and to make them efficient for modern living, and that means replanning on a grand scale. This cannot be accomplished by leaving private builders the right to erect those structures which offer the best profit nor by permitting landowners to retain sites needed for improvements. Obviously the British authorities will have to resort to wholesale condemnation, and in the interests of speed, efficiency, and fairness they may well decide to nationalize all urban land with pre-war values as the basis of compensation.

Now turn to a far broader question: By what method is the capital needed to replace the ravages of war in Europe to be obtained? Leaving aside the possibility of American loans, it is obvious that such capital must be found in the margin of current production over current consumption and, in order to ensure that this margin is adequate, it will probably be necessary to continue to curtail spending power, just as it is now held down in order to free resources for war purposes. Under the orthodox mechanisms of capitalism this end would be achieved by depressing wages, thus enabling the owners of capital to accumulate larger profits for the purpose of making new investments. Both wage-earners and capitalists would sacrifice present consumption but the sacrifice of the former would be as permanent as the gain of the latter.

In the democratic Europe which we hope to see after the war, I cannot believe that such a distribution of the burdens of reconstruction will be tolerated. It will therefore be necessary for the state to finance reconstruction as it now finances destruction. This would mean the continuance of high rates of taxation; it would probably also mean that maintenance of wage-rates would have to be accompanied by some form of compulsory savings such as J. M. Keynes has proposed as a means of financing the war. The end result of these measures would be that the capital of the country adopting them would tend to pass into the hands (a) of the state as trustee for the community as a whole, (b) of wage- and salary-earners, thus gradually producing a more even distribution of wealth. But it would not necessarily mean the extinction of private enterprise, which, I believe, should find in the future democratic state a broad but not boundless sphere of activities. To be more precise, while utilities, natural



THINGS TO COME

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monopolies, such as mines, and key industries, such as steel, seem to me to call for public ownership, the supply of goods and services in regard to which the individual taste of the consumer is an important factor might with advantage be left to the private entrepreneur. And, in this connection, I am willing to concede that *widely distributed* private property can be a bulwark of democracy so long as the privileges attached to it are not allowed to override proven public interests.

This discussion may seem to some readers to have strayed rather far from the field of international economic organization. But we cannot solve the problem of the Have and Have-Not nations while leaving unsettled that of the Have and Have-Not classes. Nearly all of the many schemes now current for promoting peace among nations stress the necessity for the surrender of national claims to absolute sovereignty. We must realize, however, that assertions of absolute sovereignty are to a large extent bound up with conceptions of property as a sacred right. Does not almost every industry in every country look upon the home market as its *Lebensraum* which must be protected from outsiders? And, as Harold Laski has pointed out in "Where Do We Go From Here?" the effort to maintain "the uneasy equilibrium between capitalism and democracy" lies behind the imperialist struggle for new markets.

The advocates of Union Now do not, in my opinion, sufficiently take into account the obstacles to their objectives provided by the present economic organization of the democratic states. They seem to regard international anarchy as a cause, rather than an effect, of the disorders of capitalism and thus tend to repeat the mistake of the Versailles treaty-makers by relying too exclusively on political cures. Mr. Streit's original proposal was for a federation composed of the United States, Great Britain, the British Dominions, and the democracies of Western Europe. Now the last group is either overrun or hemmed in by the Axis, and this leaves only the English-speaking peoples as immediate prospects for Union Now. Its proponents, however, are prepared to go ahead on this basis, leaving the way open for new adherents if and when they regain their freedom. The draft constitution for the "Union of the Free," which Mr. Streit has published, is practically identical with that of the United States, including the Bill of Rights. As Mr. Streit rightly points out, this is a "time-tested" document. Its authors were truly men of vision who contrived to allow for a growth beyond their own imaginings. Yet it is a document which reflects the political and economic ideas of its time, and its elasticity has been severely strained in attempting to cope with the problems of twentieth-century America.

I cannot avoid the feeling, therefore, that any constitution for a wider-flung democracy, while incorporating many of the basic principles of America's Founding Fathers, must also take cognizance of the need for a new economic order. We must retain our charter of political liberties but to it must be added an economic Bill of Rights which will proclaim the inalienable right of every citizen to a job at a living wage and declare the right to enjoy property not as unlimited but as subordinate to the common weal. The achievement of an Anglo-American union at this time, even if based on the substantial maintenance of the present social and economic order, might appear as a shattering reply to the totalitarian powers. Yet it is arguable that from this point of view too the proposal is dangerous, for it would lend real force to the Nazi claim that Anglo-American plutocracy is seeking to perpetuate its monopoly of world resources. We must oppose Hitler's New Order with something more attractive, more reassuring, to the common man throughout the world, with a new democracy which will vastly extend the blessings of security and equality of opportunity.

Despite these criticisms of Union Now, I believe its basic principles to be thoroughly sound. A wide, open-ended federation of nations in which the participants will merge an agreed part of their several sovereignties is the only solution for the clash of national egotisms. "Federate or Perish" is truly the watchword but federation must supply the framework for a new social order for the world, just as the Constitution of 1789 supplied a framework for progress in terms of the frontier society of its day. In the growing number of supporters of Union Now there are many ardent advocates of an economic revolution by consent. Recently I talked with the head of Federal Union, the autonomous British organization which was inspired by Mr. Streit's work. He told me that it was working on a new program which buttressed the federal idea with concrete proposals for more effective democratic political machinery and for a recasting of the economic system to provide for greater security and a higher degree of social justice. That is a move along the road which, I believe, must be followed.

It is possible here to suggest only an outline of the division of economic functions in a federation of states designed to achieve the aims outlined in President Roosevelt's declaration. The first care of the federal government of such a union will be the regulation of interstate commerce. Some writers on this subject have suggested that existing barriers will have to be removed gradually so as to ease the strain on protected producer groups. But Hitler's methods have already made nonsense of tariff systems in Europe and, although they have not freed trade in Europe, they have made clear the costly futility of selling without buying. Moreover, the end of the war will bring a tremendous demand for goods in famine-stricken Europe and it will be far easier

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to satisfy this efficiently if internal free trade is introduced immediately.

A second important federal function will be the provision of a reserve bank linking the central banks of the various states which, in Europe, are already either state-owned or closely controlled. It would be the business of this federal institution to ensure an even distribution of credit to various parts of the union, making available the surplus savings of one area to meet excess demands in another. It will also be necessary to organize a federal investment bank for the purpose of financing long-term projects and in particular to promote the development of the more backward districts.

Another formidable task will be the reorganization of interstate communications. Parts of Europe are woefully deficient in transport facilities, and existing systems have all too often been inspired by strategic rather than economic considerations. Repairing the ravages of war in this field will be an enormous job, and one that will provide a unique opportunity to create a coordinated system of highways, railroads, waterways, and airways.

Other federal economic functions would include the interstate connection of public utilities, the control and eventual socialization of interstate monopolies, and the supervision of colonies. A federal constitution insuring peace and a federal economy for maintaining production near capacity would afford the participating countries a standard of living hitherto unknown. Consider how economic development has been throttled in the past twenty years: by armaments, which even in peacetime swallow from 10 to 50 per cent of national incomes; by drives for self-sufficiency, involving the production of *ersatz* goods at three or four times the cost of imports in terms of labor effort; and by tariffs, which everywhere have undercut purchasing power by forcing it into dear markets.

There are those who gladly agree that federation would be a good thing for Europe but question the advantages of American membership. To such doubters I can only offer here two brief arguments. The inclusion of the United States in a post-war federal union with all or part of Europe would give this country moral leadership by virtue of its advanced political and economic development and it would remove for all time the danger of a clash should a United States of Europe, on which we had turned our back, struggle to maturity in isolation. From the economic angle it would mean the availability of a field of investment, politically safeguarded, which would bring new life to our capital goods industries. And the ensuing era of prosperity would enable the social and economic adjustments, which we must make under any circumstances, to be carried through with a minimum of strain. The opportunity awaits us if we have the imagination and daring to grasp it; we can take the lead in loosening the Gordian knot which is choking the life out of our civilization.

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Fighting Chance for a Sick Society

BY REINHOLD NIEBUHR

THE Western world was very sick before Hitlerism appeared as both an aggravation of its diseases and a false cure. The defeat of Nazism alone will therefore not guarantee new health and strength to the structure of Western society. It will, however, usher in a period of convalescence in which the new moral power and resolution, gained from victorious combat with a mortal enemy, will at least partially offset the physical fatigue in which the patient will have been left by the fevers and exertions of this tragic period.

There are bound to be new crises and new sinking spells in this period of convalescence in which false cures or meaningless palliatives might lead to fresh disasters. But there will be at least a possibility of nursing the residual health of a sick society back to normal vitality. So tentative a hope can prompt only the very stout-hearted to resist what all expect to be a terrible ordeal and what some regard as the prelude to the death of our civilization. The weaker members of our community seek escape from this choice by abandoning themselves to delirious dreams of a health which is not in the realm of possibilities. These dreams are unfortunately a part of the process of decay. They reveal the broken will-power and the befuddled mind which is out of touch with realities. They make death more painless and more inevitable by mistaking the drugged sleep which precedes it for new health and joy.

Yet if Hitler is defeated matters will not be too hopeless, for the simple reason that such a defeat will not have come about unless what is decent in our society has been strengthened and some of our weaknesses eliminated in the very process. If we survive at all as a society of free men, our survival itself will prove that we have learned how to correct at least some of our weaknesses. It will be possible then to build upon that achievement.

The domestic economy of all the democratic nations has been an anarchy of competing economic interests in which the eighteenth century dream of a "natural" equilibrium of economic forces has given way to a horrible daylight reality. The reality comprises elements of both anarchy and tyranny. The anarchy is the chaos of "private" interests at war with one another and unable to comprehend or to realize the common welfare; the tyrannical elements are derived from the centralization of economic power, by which industrial overlords wield a more irresponsible and a more absolute authority than the agrarian overlords whom they supplanted. The most vivid symbol of the injustice, which is the fruit of this tyranny, is the pathetic army of unemployed in every modern nation. What is left of the health of our society lies in the relative justice which a democratic political state has been able to impose upon a partially chaotic and partially tyrannical economic scheme.

Hitler's false alternative to this combination of anarchy and tyranny is a franker, more brutal, and more efficient tyranny. The irresponsible authority of economic overlords is annulled in favor of an even more irresponsible political overlordship, which does, however, have the advantage of being able to plan for the whole of the national community. The short-range effectiveness of such a political and economic unity is great enough to threaten the democratic nations with disaster. (Thyssen could not defy the national authority with impunity, but Henry Ford can.) In France the chaos of private interest and the resentment of the working classes against the injustices of this chaos were great enough to cause the defeat of the nation. Chamberlain's Britain stood on the brink of defeat for the same reasons. It escaped disaster because the disintegrating forces of modern capitalism were qualified there partly by vestigial remnants of feudalism (of which Churchill is the symbol) and partly by achievements in democratic justice (of which Bevin's authority and prestige are a convenient index). Our own achievements in democratic justice are probably somewhere between France's failure and Britain's partial success.

Certainly the war cannot be won if a greater degree of national unity does not supplant the still high measure of confusion incident upon the power of "private" enterprise to thwart a common effort; and such unity will be without justice if it is achieved by giving economic overlords more power over labor. Hence the importance of resisting all efforts to increase the power of big business in the name of efficiency in a national emergency,

Morals for a New Order

"A great politician has to bother himself less with means than with the goal." ("Mein Kampf," German edition.)

"Propaganda . . . must adopt every device of slander that ingenuity can suggest." (Ibid.)

"When I hear the word 'culture,' I pick up my revolver." (Hans Johst, president of the German poets' academy.)

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HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS

The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Sir Frederick Pollock, 1874–1932

EDITED BY

MARK DeWOLFE HOWE

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and the equal necessity of resisting labor disaffection when it is prompted by Communist loyalty to a nation allied with the Nazis. The fact that the disaffection of workers should be partly expressed and guided by a political party ostensibly opposed to Nazism but actually cooperating with it is one symptom of the moral confusion of our civilization.

If we survive at all, then, we will survive because we will have achieved some measure of unity with justice while facing the threat of a nation tyrannically unified. The efficiency of the democracies may actually remain inferior but the advantage in superior morale may prove decisive. Nevertheless, a victory would not permanently solve our domestic problems, because the unity by which it would be achieved would be partly the consequence of facing a common peril. Class antagonisms will break out afresh after the war and we shall still face the problem of bringing anarchic and tyrannical economic power under control without creating a tyrannical political power. There is no easy solution for this problem. There is, in fact, no one solution for it. If its complexities discourage us, we may be consoled by the thought that we will at least have eliminated two false solutions in the process of achieving a victory over Nazism and its impotent Communist ally.

We face a similar situation in the international issues of the Western world. Our disease is international anarchy. Hitlerism is in one sense an accentuation of that disease because it raises the principle of the moral autonomy of the nation, which lies at the root of international anarchy, into the ultimate principle of politics. It is, in another sense, a false cure for the disease. The nation which began by declaring that it knew no law but its own will, must end by seeking to impose that will as law upon all surrounding nations. We know that life is too robust and multifarious to accept such a tyrannical unification of the nations in the long run. But we do not yet know how successful it may be in the short run; and to what degree a technically efficient monopoly of violence and of industrial skill may be able to overcome the disintegrating tendencies of injustice.

It is a fact, at any rate, that this monstrous New Order has gained victory after victory over a motley assemblage of small and large nations, each of which followed only its immediate interests and faced only its immediate perils and allowed the monster to quiet the fears of one nation by false assurances while it devoured the liberties of another. Nothing now stands between us and disaster but the willingness and ability of Britain and America to subordinate national interest to a common purpose. If Hitler is defeated it will mean that some measure of international anarchy will have been overcome in the very process of defeating him.

Yet it must be observed that, as in the field of domestic politics, our victory will be incomplete and our

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solution imperfect. The problem of creating an international organization with enough power at the center to prevent disintegration and at the same time instruments of democratic control adequate to prevent imperialistic corruption is one of the most vexing and urgent to which men have ever addressed themselves. It will not be easily solved and our only encouragement must be derived from the knowledge that, in this instance, history has eliminated three false solutions: that of the Nazis, the Communists, and the men of Versailles-Geneva.

For America the problem is complicated by the fact that a way must be found to assume limited responsibilities for the democratic unification of Europe and wider responsibilities for the integration of world politics. We are not a European nation and not subject to its immediate perils; yet history has taught us that we are not finally immune to the disaster which emerges from European anarchy. A way must be found to do justice to both our immediate distance from Europe and our ultimate nearness to all its problems. If the first factor is left out of consideration by a too consistent internationalism America will repeat the experience of the last post-war years and will recoil from its larger responsibilities in a psychosis of isolationism. This very psychosis, a legacy of our past mistake, is still so deep that it may yet prevent the victory over Hitlerism which we are now assuming. If the second factor is left out of account the second world war will have been as vain as the first and American irresponsibility will bear a large share of the guilt.

As in the economic and political spheres, so also in the cultural, Nazism is both an accentuation of a diseased state and a false cure. The bourgeois world, accustomed to the covert forms of power which prevail in the economic, as against the political and military world, and to the "bloodless" manner in which the struggle for survival takes place in the realm of commerce, had long given itself to the illusion that history was the record of the gradual "spiritualization" of man and that a bourgeois civilization was on the very threshold of sublimating the problem of achieving unity and justice between men and nations into an exercise of moral suasion and rational calculation. It was forgotten that life is vitality as well as reason, that an equilibrium of vitality is involved in every achievement of justice and that every tension between life and life and interest and interest may, and even must in the final instance, become an overt contest between power and power.

To these illusions the Nazi glorification of force is a horrible alternative. Life does not justify itself merely by its power any more than rational harmonies of justice establish themselves without the use of power. The illusions of a liberal world on this score have been stubborn enough to contribute to both the rise and the quick triumphs of Nazism. Marxism took an intermediary position between Nazism and liberalism. It was provisionally

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cynical in the use of power and ultimately utopian in its belief that all power could be transcended. Under the stress of contemporary history this compromise has disintegrated. The Socialists tended to fall back into purely liberal and pacifist illusions; the Communists extended the provisional cynicism of Marxism until it became practically identical with the more basic cynicism of the Nazis.

If these illusions go by the boards—and they will have to if there is to be any victory over Hitler—this also will be only a tentative achievement. Western culture will still have to find a social philosophy which avoids the pitfalls of a rationalistic utopianism on the one hand and a cynical glorification of power on the other. No new world order can be achieved without the social organization of power in economic, political, and military terms. If our fear of imperialism and political power is so great that we blindly insist on utopia as an alternative we will end by getting chaos. Neither can a just world order be achieved without providing every possible check upon central power and every possible method of holding the vitalities of men and nations in equipoise. If that is not understood our "new order" will not differ too much from its Nazi alternative.

Labor's Stake in a Victory

BY GEORGE S. COUNTS

FROM the standpoint of labor the triumph of Hitler would be utterly disastrous. For the most part labor sees this and sees it clearly. Only a few Communist-led unions and an occasional disgruntled or personally ambitious leader affect to view the outcome of the present struggle with indifference.

To labor, this war is profoundly unlike the last. In 1914 it was not easy for many in the labor movement to choose between Germany and Austria-Hungary, on the one side, and Britain, France, and Russia, on the other. At that time Germany was at least as enlightened a country as any of its opponents. Its trade-union movement was powerful, welfare legislation was far advanced, and social democracy was a force to be reckoned with. In contrast, Russia was a land of poverty, ignorance, and tyranny. The first world war was essentially and clearly an imperialistic war in the nineteenth-century sense—a war for markets, colonies, and "spheres of influence." Although the empires in conflict differed in their moral and political ideas, the good and the right were by no means on one side.

The present conflict, by contrast, has an ethical quality that has rarely distinguished the wars of history. It cannot be interpreted as involving merely, or preponderantly, the readjustment of the boundaries of nations. The outstanding fact in this epoch is the rise of the totalitarian state with its complete subordination of the individual, its worship of race or class, its crushing of all voluntary organizations and movements, its glorification of war as man's noblest pursuit. American labor cannot be insensitive to the fact that the leaders of German trade-unionism and German democracy are either dead, in exile, or rotting in concentration camps, whereas representatives of all divisions of British labor are free and active, some of them holding positions of highest rank in the government and others permitted openly to oppose the war—even in Parliament itself. If Hitler wins, the free labor movement will be exterminated throughout the Old World; if Britain wins, that movement will lift its head again in lands where it has been crushed.

A Hitler victory, however, will mean far more than the destruction of the labor movement in Europe. It will mean the destruction of the great heritage out of which the labor movement has come. It will mean the destruction of all that is best in Western culture—the Judaic-Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man, the humanistic faith in the human mind, the democratic affirmation that ordinary men and women can and should rule themselves.

It would seem obvious that American labor must be deeply concerned in preventing such a catastrophe, yet some who presume to speak for labor contend that Britain is far away, that the United States is strong, that the fall of Britain would not necessarily mean the end of American independence. All of this, of course, may be true and still not justify American labor in reconciling itself to a Nazi victory. For in the event of such an outcome, the course of American history would be radically altered. Even if the people of the United States should continue to cherish ideals of human liberty, they would be compelled to become a great military nation or perish. They would have to arm to the teeth, build and maintain unrivaled naval and air fleets, make conscription permanent, turn schools and all other agencies of education and opinion to the cultivation of the military mind and morals. Moreover, if Nazi arms and Nazi ideas should triumph, they would achieve immeasurably greater authority than they possess today and would form a pattern to be imitated in every land. The free labor movement of America might conceivably survive the disappearance of

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its counterparts in the rest of the world but the hostility toward trade-unionism on the part of the fascist states on whose terms we would carry on trade, the compulsion to lower standards of living to support a gigantic arms program, and the necessity of competing in a world of slave labor would seem to make that hope a slim one.

The responsibility of American labor in this situation is twofold: first, to throw its energies and idealism into the task of defending American democracy against the threat of totalitarian aggression from abroad; and second, to guard, strengthen, and extend democracy at home. If the majority opinion on the consequences of a Hitler victory is correct, the first of these responsibilities cannot be evaded. On the other hand, if American democracy is not to be inadvertently lost in meeting the threat from totalitarian arms, the second must be just as conscientiously discharged.

The struggle for democracy on the home front must be waged with relentless vigor and determination. This is necessary as a purely defensive measure. People will fight best in the name of democracy only if they know that they possess its substance. But the point must also be stressed that in a highly dynamic period like the present nothing stands still. Everything either advances or retreats. And so it is with democracy. A defeat for Nazism will open the way to a more democratic world only if we will it so. That is why no blueprint of a Nazi-free world is possible, but only a program for action designed to make a defeat of Hitler a guarantee of better things to come.

The first and most fundamental point in such a program is the strengthening of organized labor as a free and independent force in American society. Under the pressure of the demand for total military defense, powerful reactionary interests are endeavoring now, and will continue to endeavor, to bring labor under state control. In the name of national unity, but actually for the sake of profits, legislation calculated to take away rights which working people have achieved through a century of bitter struggle is already being vigorously pushed by employing and fascist-minded groups. This totalitarian tendency must be combatted at all costs and at every point. The incorporation of the labor movement into the state is one of the stigmata of contemporary dictatorship.

This perversion of the defense program does not call, however, for a negative response from labor. It calls for an increased share by labor in the shaping of all public policies and particularly all policies pertaining to defense. With the enormous expansion it has enjoyed under the Roosevelt Administration, organized labor has come of age. The time has arrived for it to insist that its voice be heard on all decisions of importance to the country. If these decisions are to be made in terms of democratic purposes, the viewpoint of the working people must be ably and vigorously presented. In a very profound sense the voice of labor today is the voice of democracy.

The third point in the program is the maintenance of decent living standards for all the people, and here again the pressure to scrap hard-won achievements is intense. All efforts to reduce wages, to impair working conditions, to abandon health and safety regulations, to lower actual purchasing power, to weaken security and pension rights must be resisted. But labor cannot be satisfied with mere resistance to attacks on living and working standards. It must take the offensive. For millions of working people in all parts of the country and in all divisions of the economy, those standards are altogether too low to serve as a defense of democracy. They must not only be maintained; they must be raised.

In spite of the burden of military defense which the nation is assuming, these standards can be raised. This brings the argument to the fourth point of the program. Careful studies of the productive capacity of the economy over a period of twenty years demonstrate conclusively that the American people are living far below what is already possible, that they stand in the vestibule of an economy of abundance. The forces of democracy must insist on the full employment of labor, on the release of the productive energies of industrial technology, on the direction of these energies to the improvement of

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the lot of the common man. If, in the course of the struggle now developing in the world, it should become necessary for labor to make material sacrifices to insure victory for the ways of freedom, labor would unquestionably be willing to make such sacrifices. It always has. But until full use is made of available energies and resources, standards should be maintained, increased, and made more generally applicable.

The fifth point in the program is the framing of a system of taxation deliberately designed to prevent the further concentration of wealth. War and the conditions of war have always been occasions for the making of profits and fortunes. The crowning irony of the present struggle for democracy would be the continued whittling away of the economic foundations of freedom and security for the masses of the people. The only method of forestalling this, short of widespread socialization of business enterprise, is a plan of taxation which would actually take the profits out of war. Labor must insist that the President be held to his pledge that no millionaire will emerge out of the defense program. Where business refuses to put its service at the disposal of the nation the only course left to a democracy is some form of government operation.

The maintenance and extension of public education and all social services constitute a sixth point in the program. Today a concerted nation-wide drive to reduce school budgets is under way—a drive that is backed by big tax-payers who desire to protect their economic interests and by reactionary elements in society who, fearing an enlightened people, oppose the establishment of a comprehensive and adequate system of education. Particularly important is the necessity of further equalizing educational opportunity so that there will be no underprivileged generation in any section, class, race, or minority of the nation. Only liberal grants from the federal government will make this possible.

Closely related to the extension of educational opportunity is the defense of civil rights and liberties for all. In this sphere Britain has set an example which America should follow. Although the English people are facing dangers unsurpassed in history, they have upheld with remarkable courage and loyalty the highest standards of the liberal tradition. Without the guarantees of free speech, press, assembly, organization, and petition, the democratic process becomes a farce. And without this process of untrammeled discussion, criticism, and group decision, there can be no assurance of the perpetuation of free institutions. The suppression of the Bill of Rights, even for a period, is a dangerous step in the direction of the totalitarian state. Labor cannot afford to be caught napping on this crucial issue.

Defense of civil liberties does not imply, however, that labor should be tolerant of totalitarian encroachments in its own ranks, whether from the right or the

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left. It is of course natural for organizations of working people to oppose all fascist and Nazi tendencies. They must also oppose every effort on the part of the Communist Party to insinuate itself into their organizations and to impose its line on their decisions. Nothing could be more fraudulent than the "defense of human liberty" by the followers of a dictator, whether that dictator resides in the United States or a foreign land. All who enter the lists for democracy should be asked to show their credentials.

The ninth point in the program is preparation to meet the economic dislocation following the war. That such dislocations, deep and widespread, will come is as certain as death and taxes. Labor should be ready to meet them. Even if the American people succeed in remaining out of the armed conflict, the collapse of the war markets will carry with it a collapse of the entire war industry. If millions of working people are not to be thrown on the streets, if the economy is not to enter a period of general paralysis, provision will have to be made for enlarging peacetime industries sufficiently to provide employment for all. Labor should undertake immediately the studies necessary to the framing of a plan to achieve this end.

Finally, there is the vast and intricate problem of social reconstruction which has faced every industrial nation since the opening of the present century and which was made acute and chronic by the first world war. Labor must give thought and direction to the correction of those domestic and world conditions out of which the totalitarian movements and states emerged. The defeat of Hitler, crucial though it is to the survival of even the ideas of liberty and democracy, would be futile if it did not lead to a stable and just social order. Here lies the supreme challenge of the contemporary struggle to organized labor and all friends of democracy.

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